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I.  Introduction 
In the last year, two new developments—one legal and one 
technological—have converged, placing the legal system at a critical juncture 
as it strives towards a workable set of rules for understanding and regulating 
Internet search engine technology.  The August 2010 ruling by the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Rosetta Stone v. Google1 and the 
October 2010 release of Google Inc.’s "Google Goggles"2 technology for the 
Apple iPhone3 (which greatly expanded consumer access to Google 
Goggles)4 together represent an impending paradigm shift in both the 
technical means of Internet searching and the legal response to evolving 
technology.  The District Court’s ruling in Rosetta Stone, while correctly 
decided and forward-thinking, contains fatal flaws in its analysis of 
trademark law’s "functionality doctrine"; meanwhile, the increasing ubiquity 
of Google’s Google Goggles technology is challenging the boundaries of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534–35 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (holding that Google did not infringe Rosetta Stone’s trademarks by using them as 
keywords in its AdWords online advertising program). 
 2. See infra Part II.C (explaining in more detail the Google Goggles technology, 
which is a software program for smartphones that allows a user to take pictures of virtually 
anything, using his or her mobile device’s camera, and use those digital images as search 
inputs, in lieu of keywords, to run Google searches). 
 3. See Frank Reed, Google Goggles for iPhone Released, MARKETING PILGRIM (Oct. 
6, 2010), http://www.marketingpilgrim.com/2010/10/google-goggles-for-iphone-released. 
html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (announcing the release of Google Goggles for the Apple 
iPhone) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See MG Siegler, Search by Sight with Google Goggles, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 
2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/07/google-goggles (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
(announcing the availability of Google Goggles for Android smart phones) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  The release of Google Goggles for the iPhone followed 
the December 2009 release of a beta version of Google Goggles for smart phones running 
the Google Android operating system.  The release of Google Goggles for the iPhone is of 
particular significance because it marks the point at which Google Goggles became freely 
available to the majority of the smartphone-using public.  See Paul Miller, Canalys:  Android 
Takes Q2 Smartphone Market Share Lead in US with 886 Percent Year-Over-Year Growth, 
ENGADGET (Aug. 2, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2010/08/02/canalys-
android-takes-q2-smartphone-market-share-lead-in-us-wit (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
(reporting the combined U.S. market share of Apple mobile devices and Android mobile 
devices as 55.7% of the market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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what it means to interface with search engines and is a portent of greater 
advances to come.  The convergence of these two events—the Rosetta Stone 
decision and the arrival of Google Goggles—provides a dramatic lesson in 
why courts must decide trademark disputes correctly if trademark law is to 
remain an effective body of law to police online commerce and why the 
intellectual property doctrine of functionality has no place in trademark 
infringement claims on the Internet. 
The argument presented in this Note is threefold.  First, Rosetta Stone 
was rightly decided for the wrong reasons.  The district court, struggling 
under the constraints of traditional trademark law doctrine to reach a result 
that would allow Google to use the Rosetta Stone marks without imposing 
legal liability, misinterpreted and misapplied the functionality doctrine to 
provide Google with a superfluous legal justification for its actions.5 
Second, although the court in Rosetta Stone was well-meaning, its use of 
the functionality doctrine to validate Google’s sale of trademarks to third-
party online advertisers will have unintended and damaging consequences for 
search engines, mark-holders, and the legal system as a whole.  The emerging 
technology embodied in Google Goggles provides a perfect predictive lens 
through which to imagine these consequences.  In short, new search 
technologies militate against using the functionality doctrine in trademark 
infringement claims against search engines and similar online entities.  The 
district court’s decision to dismiss Rosetta Stone’s trademark infringement 
claims had sufficient footing on separate legal grounds without needing to 
resort to use of the functionality doctrine:  The doctrine has no place in 
Internet-based trademark infringement claims. 
Third, the fact that Rosetta Stone’s claim could have been dismissed on 
other grounds alone does not negate the fact that courts struggle mightily with 
trademark infringement claims against search engines and are in need of a 
new legal doctrine in this context to allow fair and economically efficient use 
of trademarks by online entities.  The Rosetta Stone court’s sweeping 
expansion of the functionality doctrine was a direct result of its inability to 
utilize the better-suited "nominative fair use" doctrine adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit, but thus far rejected by the Fourth Circuit.6  On appeal, the Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Amy E. Bivins, Google Prevails in AdWords Infringement Case Under 
Keyword ‘Functionality’ Doctrine, BNA:  PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY 
(Aug. 13, 2010), available at http://news.bna.com.ezproxy.wlu.edu/ptln/PTLNWB/split_ 
display.adp?fedfid=17619264&vname=ptcjnotallissues&fcn=16&wsn=497363500&fn=176
19264&split=0 ("[T]he functionality doctrine has not been raised frequently in keyword 
advertising litigation, and was a somewhat novel component of the court’s decision . . . ."). 
 6. See Brief of International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae at 23, Rosetta 
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-2007 (4th Cir. Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter INTA Brief] 
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Circuit should vacate the court’s decision and adopt the doctrine of 
nominative use. 
Part II of this Note explains the revolution in Internet searching 
precipitated by Google Goggles, its relation to Google’s revenue-generating 
AdWords technology,7 and the legal response that must necessarily be 
forthcoming in order to make efficient use of these technologies.  Part III 
introduces the latest shot across Google’s bow in the battle over Google’s 
AdWords technology and its use of trademarks in that technology, Rosetta 
Stone v. Google.  Part III’s discussion focuses primarily on the district court’s 
flawed application of trademark law’s functionality doctrine:  It demonstrates 
that the functionality doctrine has no place in the determination of whether 
Internet search companies’ use of trademarks to generate advertising revenue 
is legal or fair to mark-holders.  Part IV connects the court’s erroneous 
functionality analysis in Rosetta Stone to the new search technology 
encapsulated by Google Goggles and explains why the court’s reasoning is 
wholly inadequate to deal with this emerging technology and should be 
overturned on appeal.  Part V of this Note proposes a way forward for the 
Fourth Circuit, and for courts generally, as they struggle to regulate Google 
and other Internet search companies’ use of trademarks.  It concludes, first, 
that both total protection for mark-holders based on traditional trademark law 
and total indemnification from liability for search engines based on the 
functionality doctrine are inefficient and undesirable outcomes; and second, 
that the Rosetta Stone decision should be vacated and that the Fourth Circuit 
should adopt the nominative use doctrine. 
  
                                                                                                                 
(urging the adoption of the nominative fair use doctrine by the Fourth Circuit).  The 
International Trademark Association, in its amicus brief to the Fourth Circuit in Rosetta 
Stone v. Google argues that the "nominative fair use" doctrine gives the defendant the "right 
to use another’s trademark . . . as long as:  (1) the product or service in question is one not 
readily identifiable without the use of the trademark, (2) the use of the mark . . . is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service, and (3) the user does not do anything 
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder."  Id. 
 7. See infra Part II.B (explaining in further detail the operation of AdWords, which is 
an online auction program that allows businesses to bid on and buy search terms, which 
Google users input when searching, in order to have the winning bidder’s advertisements 
displayed on the search results pages for certain terms). 
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II.  Google AdWords, Google Goggles, and the Search Revolution 
A. Google’s Position in the Market 
In the realm of Internet search technology, one name stands above all 
others in the popular consciousness:  Google.  Google, Inc. is a hugely 
influential company, the operations of which affect every consumer of 
Internet services on a daily basis and provide a plethora of services that are 
indispensible to the function of the Internet as we know it.8  Google’s bread-
and-butter service is, and always has been, Internet searching.9  Constantly 
pioneering new means of Internet searching, Google is both the dominant 
actor and the leading "norm creator"10 in the search technology sector.  Using 
aggregating, indexing, and ranking technology superior to that of its 
competitors,11 Google has grown from a novel start-up to a household name 
in Internet services in just over a decade.12 
Along the way, as Google has defended its various business practices in 
court, the legal system has struggled to keep up with Google’s ever-evolving, 
increasingly ubiquitous technology.13  Perhaps more than any other of its 
business practices, Google’s advertising programs—specifically its AdWords 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Inside the Googleplex, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2007, at 56–58 (noting that many 
Internet-users "keep their photos, blogs, videos, calendars, e-mail, news feeds, maps, 
contacts, social networks, documents, spreadsheets, presentations, and credit-card 
information—in short, much of their lives—on Google’s computers"); Who’s Afraid of 
Google?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2007, at 9 (observing that, while other search engines do 
exist, "Google, through the sheer speed with which it accumulates the treasure of 
information, will be the one to test the limits of what society can tolerate"). 
 9. See KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED:  THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 7 (2009) 
(estimating the number of daily searches performed on Google each day to be over 3 
billion). 
 10. Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on 
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 784 (2004) (coining the term to describe courts that deal 
with consumer confusion cases involving Internet search technology, noting that "the rules 
they develop will determine practices on the Web and whether the Internet realizes its 
potential as a vast clearinghouse of information and content"). 
 11. See AULETTA, supra note 9, at 6 (describing Google’s "secret sauce," a complex 
set of algorithms that "not only rank those [Internet] links that generate the most traffic, and 
are therefore presumed to be more reliable," but also "assign a higher qualitative ranking to 
more reliable sources—like for instance, a New York Times story"). 
 12. See Googleplex, supra note 8, at 56–58 (noting that Google’s "share price has 
quintupled since 2004 [the year of its IPO], making Google worth $160 billion" in 2007). 
 13. See Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1328–29 (2008) 
("While the law should be cautious in how it regulates new technologies such as Google, as 
Justice Cardozo once noted, major technological changes often call for the transformation of 
law."). 
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program—have generated the most complex and novel legal challenges for 
the courts.14  Driven by trademark-holders who accuse Google of direct and 
contributory trademark infringement through its AdWords program, these 
legal actions have led to a patchwork of inconsistent judicial opinions 
interpreting federal trademark law and stretching the limits of traditional 
trademark doctrines.15  The underlying tension in these rulings is an 
economic balancing act requiring courts to weigh the commercial benefits of 
strong trademark protection for mark-holders on the one hand, against the 
social and economic value of consumer access to freely and quickly 
accessible online information provided by search engine companies on the 
other.16 
Google’s track record in these trademark disputes has been mixed.17  As 
search engine technology has matured, the courts seem to have reached a 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 545 (E.D. Va. 
2010)  (involving an action against Google for the sale of trademarked terms to third-party 
advertisers through Google’s AdWords advertising system); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google 
Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2nd Cir. 2009) (same); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper 
Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 
2007) (same); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. ("GEICO") v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 
702 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same). 
 15. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 802 ("[A] handful of courts have widened 
the net of trademark infringement to encompass search engines . . . and others who help 
competitors reach their audiences through nontraditional ‘uses’ of established marks."). 
 16. See id. at 786–92 (discussing the general economic rationale behind the law of 
trademarks, including the reduction of "search costs" and the protection of "goodwill"). 
 17. See cases cited supra note 14 (involving trademark infringement or dilution 
actions against Google for the sale of trademarked terms to third-party advertisers through 
Google’s AdWords advertising system).  Rosetta Stone’s trademark infringement claims 
against Google were dismissed, and Rosetta Stone has appealed to the Fourth Circuit.  See 
Don Jeffrey, Rosetta Stone Appeals Loss to Google in Trademark Case over Web Searches, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 1, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-
01/rosetta-stone-appeals-loss-to-google-in-trademark-case-over-web-searches.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2011) ("Rosetta Stone Inc. appealed a judge’s ruling that Google Inc. didn’t 
infringe its trademarks by selling the language-software maker’s marks to rivals for use as 
search keywords.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  Rescuecom’s 
infringement claim against Google was dismissed by the trial court; however, the Second 
Circuit reversed the trial court, finding that Google’s AdWords practices constituted "use in 
commerce."  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2009).  Google settled its 
litigation with American Blinds in what was widely seen as a victory for Google.  See Linda 
Rosencrance, American Blinds Drops Trademark Infringement Suit Against Google, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 4, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/ 
9034322/American_Blinds_drops_trademark_infringement_suit_against_Google_?intsrc=ne
ws_ts_head (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (noting that American Blinds dropped the suit 
without Google having "to pay any money to settle the dispute") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  The court in GEICO denied Google’s motion to dismiss 
the claims against it, but ultimately found for Google "on the issue of infringement, finding 
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loose consensus that Google’s sale of trademarked terms to third parties does 
fall within the Lanham Act’s definition of "use[] in commerce,"18 potentially 
subjecting Google to liability for trademark infringement claims.19  
Additionally, courts have expanded the traditional reach of the trademark 
infringement cause of action by developing the doctrine of "initial interest 
confusion,"20 which can function as an almost separate cause of action in 
Internet cases21 and has the potential to further mire Google and other 
Internet search providers in trademark infringement litigation.22  The legal 
theories underlying trademark infringement actions against Google are 
discussed in more detail in Parts III and V. 
B.  Google AdWords 
Foremost among the legal challenges to Google’s search business have 
been actions based in trademark law that attack Google’s primary source of 
                                                                                                                 
that GEICO failed to demonstrate a likelihood of consumer confusion."  Lastowka, supra 
note 13, at 1387. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).  The Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127) sets 
out the federal cause of action for trademark infringement.  One element of an infringement 
claim is proof that a defendant "uses" a mark "in commerce," "on or in connection with any 
goods or services."  Id.  "Use in commerce" is defined as "the bona fide use of a mark in the 
ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a mark."  15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2000). 
 19. See, e.g., GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (denying Google’s motion to dismiss; 
finding that plaintiff GEICO adequately alleged trademark use).  Along with the trademark 
infringement cause of action, courts have also used the "trademark dilution" cause of action 
as a means of protecting trademark owners, but the focus of this Note will be solely on 
trademark infringement.  For a thorough explanation of the developing doctrine of trademark 
dilution, including the 2006 passage of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, see Lastowka, 
supra note 13, at 1367–70; see also Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(2) (2000) (establishing two types of federal dilution harm, "dilution by blurring" 
and "dilution by tarnishment"); Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1367 ("Dilution’s controversial 
innovation is that it protects marks without the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate consumer 
confusion."). 
 20. See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:6 (4th ed.) 
("Infringement can be based upon confusion that creates initial customer interest, even 
though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion."). 
 21. See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 507, 564 (2005) ("Courts have also been unclear whether IIC [initial interest confusion] 
supports a determination of a ‘likelihood of consumer confusion,’ or if IIC creates a different 
measurement for infringement, such as a ‘likelihood of initial interest confusion.’"). 
 22. See id. at 559 ("With its doctrinal flexibility, [initial interest confusion] has 
become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have not actually 
engaged in misappropriative uses."). 
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revenue, online advertising.23  Google’s substantial advertising revenue24 is 
generated primarily through its AdWords technology.25  AdWords is an 
online auction system that allows third-party advertisers to purchase from 
Google, as "triggers," individual words or phrases that Internet users might 
input when using Google to search.26  AdWords constitutes just one of the 
many mechanisms Google uses to generate advertising revenue through 
commercial use of its search engine, although it is by far the most 
prominent.27 
The AdWords system works by displaying sponsored search results 
separately from "organic" search results on the search results webpage.28  
When a Google user searches for a trigger term, the organic search results 
generated by Google’s algorithms are accompanied by "sponsored links" 
(advertisements) to the right and top of the results page.29  These sponsored 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See cases cited supra note 14 (citing cases involving trademark infringement or 
dilution actions against Google for the sale of trademarked terms to third-party advertisers 
through Google’s AdWords advertising system). 
 24. See AULETTA, supra note 9, at xi ("Google’s advertising revenues—more than 
twenty billion dollars a year—account for 40 percent of all the advertising dollars spent 
online."); Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K) at 41 (Feb. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312510030774/d10k.htm (showing 
Google’s revenue from advertising to be 97% of its total revenue in 2009). 
 25. See Duncan Ross, Beginner’s Guide to Google AdWords, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/ 
beginners-guide-to-google-adwords/20090615-c9n1.html (providing, in layman’s terms, a 
brief overview of Google’s AdWords technology aimed at small business-owners who might 
be interested in utilizing AdWords to advertise their businesses). 
 26. See Google, How Search Ads Works, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ka4tCkYXHiE (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (explaining 
the function of AdWords).  For a more detailed explanation of the way in which AdWords 
technology operates and the arguments for and against Google’s use of AdWords, see 
Ashley Tan, Note, Google AdWords:  Trademark Infringer or Trade Liberalizer?, 16 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 473, 474–80 (2010). 
 27. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1348 (discussing a second prominent advertising 
method for Google, its "AdSense" technology).  AdSense is a "program whereby website 
owners are paid by Google to provide advertising space on their websites where AdWords 
advertisements are displayed."  Id. at 1349.  In this regard, AdSense is effectively an 
outgrowth of Google’s AdWords program. 
 28. See How Search Ads Work, supra note 26 (noting that Google’s organic search 
results are always displayed on the left-hand side of the results page, while advertisements 
are displayed, if at all, on the top and right-hand side of the page). 
 29. See id. (explaining Google’s commitment to transparency and ease of use on its 
search results page and noting that it is in the company’s self-interest to allow users to easily 
distinguish between organic and sponsored results).  Google is extremely diligent and 
inflexible about the on-screen graphical boundaries between organic and sponsored search 
results:  The company maintains as part of its stated mission the goal of making clear to 
users which results are organic and which are sponsored.  But cf. Lastowka, supra note 13, at 
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links are displayed because advertisers have purchased specific search terms 
from Google, through a competitive bidding system, which are then tethered 
to the advertisers’ sponsored results.30  Trigger words can be terms in 
common usage, like "fly fishing," or they might be trademarked terms, like 
"Orvis."31  Thus, a competitor company to Orvis may purchase the term 
"Orvis" as a Google AdWord so that when a user searches for "Orvis," the 
competitor’s advertisement will appear on the right-hand side of the search 
results page, allowing users to click on it and view the competitor’s website.32 
The ability of third-party advertisers to buy terms with trademark 
meanings did not always exist.  In 2004, Google made a conscious decision 
to stop restricting the sale of trademarked terms to only the holders of those 
marks.33  Before its initial public offering in 2004, Google announced that it 
would accept "bids for terms that corresponded with the names of brands" 
from any bidder, not just the holder of the brand’s trademark.34  Shortly after 
Google announced its decision, the first of many trademark infringement and 
dilution suits against the company was brought by the insurance carrier 
GEICO for selling its brand name, "Geico," as an AdWords trigger term.35  
Since 2004, Google has faced several more legal challenges to its sale of 
terms with trademark meanings to advertisers other than the mark-holders, 
the most recent of which is Rosetta Stone v. Google, discussed at length in 
Part III.36 
                                                                                                                 
1345 ("The left/right distinction is very important to Google, but studies have shown it is not 
important to the average user."). 
 30. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1339–40 (detailing the operation and origin of 
Google’s bidding system and noting that it was a business model originally developed by 
one of Google’s competitors, GoTo.com, which Google later acquired). 
 31. See id. at 1343–44 (using another example, the search term "Nike," to illustrate the 
distinction between sponsored and organic results and providing screenshots of sample 
Google results pages to clarify the explanation). 
 32. See id. at 1344 ("In the right column, various AdWords advertisements for the 
search term ‘Nike’ are listed.  These include advertisers that sell Nike footwear as well as 
other brands of sneakers."). 
 33. See Stefanie Olsen, Google Plans Trademark Gambit, CNET NEWS (Apr. 13, 
2004), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1038_3-5190324.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
("Google plans to stop limiting sales of trademarks in its popular keyword advertising 
program, a high-stakes gamble that could boost revenue but also create new legal problems 
for the company.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1360. 
 35. See GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (involving an action by an insurance company 
against Google for the sale of a trademarked term, in this case "Geico," to third-party 
advertisers through Google’s AdWords advertising program). 
 36. See Stephanie Yu Lim, Comment, Can Google Be Liable For Trademark 
Infringement?  A Look at the "Trademark Use" Requirement as Applied to Google AdWords, 
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C.  Google Goggles 
With AdWords as its core revenue-generating engine, Google has 
continued to expand the channels by which consumers of Internet search 
services can access its search engine and thereby be exposed to advertising 
content.37  Not traditionally a company to rest on its laurels, Google has 
recently thrown the world of Internet search technology into flux once again 
with a potentially paradigm-shifting expansion of its search technology.38  
Historically, the dominant, indeed the sole, way to input information into an 
Internet search engine has been through either text or voice input (which is 
then converted to text).39  Until quite recently, in order to search for 
something using a conventional search engine, an Internet user would have 
needed to input the desired search term in textual form—for instance the 
word "Pepsi"—into the search engine’s text bar, and then the search engine 
would return a list of relevant results.40  Google’s latest search technology, 
Google Goggles, has expanded the way Internet users can search by 
eliminating the need for textual input.41  Now, using the Google Goggles 
software, those with smartphones and other mobile devices can search based 
directly on images—pictures taken with a device’s camera—with the images 
themselves functioning as the inputs into the search engine.42  The technology 
                                                                                                                 
14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 265, 270–81 (2007) (providing a comprehensive survey of previous 
legal challenges to Google’s practice of selling trademarked terms as AdWords triggers). 
 37. See Harry McCracken, The Undiscovered Google:  7 Services You Need to Try, 
FOX NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/03/09/undiscovered-
google-services-need-try (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (listing some of the lesser known and 
emerging services provided by Google, including Google Fast Flip, Google Product Search, 
Google Squared, and Google Voice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. See Claudine Beaumont, Google Launches Google Goggles Visual Search, 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 7, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google 
/6752725/Google-launches-Google-Goggles-visual-search.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
(announcing the worldwide launch of Google’s "Google Goggles" visual search technology) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 511 (explaining that, conventionally, "[s]earch 
engines [would] allow a searcher to enter a keyword into a search box and make a query 
against a database of content"). 
 40. See Google, How Search Works, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=BNHR6IQJGZs&feature=channel (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (noting that the 
conventional way to search with Google is to "type in [one’s] search . . . and hit return"). 
 41. See Google, Google Goggles, YOUTUBE (Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Hhgfz0zPmH4&feature=player_embedded (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (giving a 
brief video overview of Google Goggle’s capabilities and uses). 
 42. See id. (demonstrating the uses of a Google Goggles-enabled smartphone, which 
can capture images with its camera and immediately generate Google search results based on 
the images). 
LOST IN TRANSLATION 1515 
works by breaking down images into "object-based signatures."43  Google’s 
search engine "then compares those signatures against every item it can find 
in its image database" and returns relevant webpage results to the user, just as 
if the search had been done using conventional text input.44  In other words, 
instead of typing the word "Pepsi" into Google’s search bar, an individual 
with a smartphone can simply take a picture of the Pepsi logo on a can of 
Pepsi, and Google will return search results based on that logo.45 
While still in its technological infancy, Google Goggles and its 
successors have the potential to expand drastically the available potential 
inputs for Internet search engines.  No longer are users confined to textual 
keywords for their searches; now, images, and in time sounds, music,46 video 
content, and even tastes and smells will be available channels for generating 
search engine results.47  Of course, with this sweeping expansion of search 
                                                                                                                 
 43. JR Raphael, A Hands-On Tours:  Google Goggles Visual Search, PC WORLD 
(Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/183933/a_handson_tour_google_goggles_ 
visual_search.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (noting that "Google Goggles doesn’t work well with food, cars, plants, or 
animals," but that "[d]evelopers say the app will soon be able to recognize plants by their 
leaves, even suggest chess moves by ‘seeing’ an image of your current board").  The Google 
Goggles software currently works best with business cards, logos, book covers, wine labels, 
pieces of art, and the like.  Id.  The ultimate goal for the program is for Goggles to have the 
capability to recognize any image with the aid of Google’s enormous database of digital 
images.  Id. 
 46. See Carrie-Ann Skinner, Shazam Launches BlackBerry Music Recognition App, 
PC ADVISOR (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/index.cfm?NewsID=113645 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (announcing the launch of music recognition software for the 
BlackBerry mobile device) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  Software 
that allows users to identify songs by holding their computers or mobile devices up to a 
source of music have existed for a number of years, and while Google has not been at the 
forefront of this particular technology, there is every reason to believe that a marriage of 
song-recognition software and search engine technology is in the near future.  See Fabrizio 
Pilato, AT&T Wireless Launches First Music Recognition Software in the U.S., MOBILE 
MAG. (Apr. 15, 2004, 1:01 AM), http://www.mobilemag.com/2004/04/15/att-wireless-
launches-first-music-recognition-service-in-the-us (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (announcing 
one of the first music recognition software offerings by a U.S. cellular phone company) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Bits:  Video Search Company Gets Investor Attention, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/video-search-
company-gets-investor-attention (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) ("3VR Security, based in San 
Francisco, Calif., says it has solved that problem with technology that automatically catalogs 
video footage so that it can be searched at a later date, just like looking up a query on 
Google.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stephen Williams, 
Gadgetwise:  Discovered While Nosing Around CES . . . ., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2011, 7:14 
AM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/discovered-while-nosing-around-c-e-
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methods comes a tempest of legal challenges for courts to contend with.  
What rights, if any, will trademark and copyright holders have to keep 
Google from using their corporate logos or brand images as visual triggers for 
a new, evolved AdWords (or perhaps "AdPics") program?  Should trademark 
law restrict Google or others from allowing their consumers to use sights, 
sounds, and words as inputs into its search engine?  Does public policy weigh 
in favor of giving search engines unfettered use of protected content in the 
name of generating relevant search results?  Most importantly, is the body of 
trademark law equipped to decide these questions? 
Although the rapid evolution of search engine technology leaves many 
legal problems to be resolved, they are largely beyond the scope of this 
Note.48  The latest legal challenge to Google’s AdWords program does, 
however, offer a vision of what future legal responses to this changing 
technology may look like if courts insist on misapplying and contorting 
existing intellectual property law doctrines to fit the novel facts presented by 
Internet cases of this type.  After presenting the facts and legal analysis of 
Rosetta Stone v. Google in Part III of this Note, Part IV’s discussion centers 
around the dangers to both the body of trademark law and the right of free 
access to relevant online information caused by further flawed legal 
reasoning of the type present in Rosetta Stone.  Part V proposes a solution 
that keeps Google’s challenged practices within traditional trademark law 
analysis but ensures continued broad access to the wealth of information 
Google’s technology provides. 
III.  Rosetta Stone v. Google 
A.  Facts of the Case:  Google’s AdWords; Rosetta Stone’s Marks 
Rosetta Stone is a Virginia corporation that creates "technology-based 
language learning products and services"49 and is internationally known as 
                                                                                                                 
s/?scp=1&sq=CES%20smell&st=cse (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (discussing an emerging 
technology that coordinates the release of specific smells into a consumer’s home based on 
digital signals embedded in television and video programming) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 552 (noting that "[f]ederal trademark law applies 
to Internet conduct in three principal ways: trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and 
anti-cybersquatting").  As Professor Goldman points out, "all three laws have important 
implications for Internet search."  Id.  However, the focus of this Note is chiefly on 
trademark infringement. 
 49. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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one of the premier makers of language learning software in the world.50  
After learning that Google had begun selling keywords that Rosetta Stone 
had registered as trademarks51 to third-party advertisers through the AdWords 
program, the company brought claims of trademark infringement and dilution 
against Google in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.52  
The claims were made on the grounds that Google was "actively 
assisting . . . advertisers to mislead consumers and misappropriate Rosetta 
Stone’s trademarks by using the trademarks (1) as keyword triggers for paid 
advertisements and (2) within the title and text of paid advertisements on 
Google’s website."53  Rosetta Stone alleged that, by giving third-party 
advertisers 
the right to use the Rosetta Stone Marks or words, phrases, or terms 
similar to those Marks as keyword triggers that cause Sponsored Links 
to be displayed, Google [was] helping these advertisers misdirect web 
users to websites of companies that (i) compete with Rosetta Stone, 
(ii) sell language education programs from Rosetta Stone’s competitors, 
(iii) sell counterfeit Rosetta Stone products, or (iv) are entirely unrelated 
to language education.54 
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court ruled in 
Google’s favor on all relevant trademark issues, finding that Google was 
"not directly, vicariously, or contributorily liable for its sale of trademarks 
as advertising keywords."55  Rosetta Stone has appealed the ruling to the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See Alex Madrigal, My First Night with Rosetta Stone, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 12, 
2011, 11:01 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/my-first-night-
with-rosetta-stone/69384 (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (noting that Rosetta Stone is "by far the 
most heavily marketed and well-known" language software) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Ernest Scheyder, Rosetta Stone Suit vs. Google Dismissed, REUTERS 
(Apr. 29, 2010, 6:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63S5DD20100429 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010) ("Rosetta sells software to help users learn one of 31 languages, 
including Farsi, French and Irish.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (establishing that Rosetta Stone holds 
the following federally registered trademarks:  "Rosetta Stone, Rosetta Stone Language 
Learning Success, Rosettastone.com, and Rosetta World"). 
 52. See id. at 534–35 (summarizing the five main issues before the District Court, 
which included the issue "whether Google’s use of Rosetta Stone’s trademarks as keyword 
triggers under its advertising program is functional and, therefore, a non-infringing use").  
Referring to the case, Rosetta Stone CEO Tom Adams was quoted by Reuters as saying, 
"‘It’s not just about Rosetta Stone, frankly . . . .  This is happening for lots and lots of other 
companies.  We’re willing to stick our neck out.  Google is a very intimidating company.’"  
Scheyder, supra note 50. 
 53. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 534. 
 54. Id. at 539. 
 55. Bivins, supra note 5.  The court held that:  (1) Google’s practice of auctioning 
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it is currently pending.56  The 
district court’s decision in favor of Google has been controversial and has 
drawn both criticism and praise from interested parties,57 many of whom 
have joined the action as amici, filing numerous briefs with the appeals 
court.58  The critiques of the district court’s decision are too numerous to fit 
within the scope of this Note,59 but the one which has drawn perhaps the 
most critical attention is the district court’s ruling that Google’s use of the 
Rosetta Stone marks was protected by trademark law’s functionality 
doctrine.60 
B.  The Court’s Decision 
Before delving into the district court’s functionality analysis, it is 
important to frame it within the court’s broader opinion.  The district 
                                                                                                                 
marks as keyword triggers for links sponsored by third-party advertisers did not constitute 
direct trademark infringement; (2) functionality doctrine protected Google’s use of the 
marks; (3) Google was not liable for contributory trademark infringement; (4) Google was 
not liable for vicarious trademark infringement; and (5) Google could not be held liable for 
trademark dilution.  Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 534.  The court granted Google’s 
motion for summary judgment on the trademark infringement claim because "no reasonable 
trier of fact could find that Google’s practice of auctioning Rosetta Stone’s trademarks as 
keyword triggers to third-party advertisers creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source 
or origin of Rosetta Stone’s products."  Id. at 540. 
 56. See generally Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007 (4th Cir. filed Sept. 
1, 2010). 
 57. Sheri Qualters, Showdown over Web Searches, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202476363617 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011) (noting that various interested parties have filed briefs challenging the district court’s 
analysis of "likelihood of confusion," "trademark dilution," "functionality doctrine," and 
"contributory infringement," among other issues) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 58. See id. (reporting that "[m]ore than three dozen technology and consumer products 
companies and trade groups" have joined as amici, including "Coach Inc., Ford Motor Co. 
and Tiffany & Co and technology companies such as TiVo Inc. and Viacom Inc."). 
 59. See id. (enumerating the errors of the district court’s ruling).  Criticisms of the 
district court’s ruling include claims that it decided the "functionality doctrine" issue 
wrongly, that it failed to find Google liable for "contributory trademark infringement," that it 
failed to apply the doctrine of "nominative fair use," and that it misapplied the nine-factor 
test for analyzing "consumers’ likelihood of confusion" by "ignoring six factors" and 
"erroneously" analyzing the other three.  Id. 
 60. See Bivins, supra note 5 (noting that the International Trademark Association 
called the district court’s analysis a "‘radical interpretation of the functionality doctrine’ 
to . . . focus on whether Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone mark served a functional role in 
Google’s business"). 
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court’s holding—that Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks is protected 
by virtue of the functionality doctrine—came in the final section of its 
direct trademark infringement analysis, after its conclusion that Google’s 
use of the mark was noninfringing on other grounds.61  Mapping the 
traditional cause of action for direct trademark infringement,62 the court 
found the parties’ sole dispute to be over the existence of "consumer 
confusion" related to Google’s use of the marks.63  Furthermore, of the 
traditional "nine factors" used to judge consumer confusion, "only three of 
the nine confusion factors [were] in dispute."64  Examining the issues of 
"(1) defendant’s intent; (2) actual [consumer] confusion; and (3) the 
consuming public’s sophistication,"65 one by one, the court found that 
"Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks [did] not amount to direct 
trademark infringement."66 
In particular, on the issue of Google’s intent, the court found that 
"Google [was] not attempting to pass off its goods or services as Rosetta 
Stone’s."67  Rebuffing one of Rosetta Stone’s main contentions, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 545 ("Notwithstanding a favorable finding 
for Google under the relevant infringement elements, the functionality doctrine protects 
Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone Marks as keyword triggers."). 
 62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (setting forth the federal cause of action for 
trademark infringement).  Under the Lanham Act, a cause of action for trademark 
infringement requires a plaintiff to prove five elements: "that (1) it possesses a mark; 
(2) defendant used the mark; (3) defendant’s use of the mark occurred in commerce; 
(4) defendant used the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of goods or service; and (5) defendant used the mark in a manner likely to 
confuse consumers as to the source or origin of goods or service."  Rosetta Stone, 730 F. 
Supp. 2d at 540 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 
359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 63. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 540.  As the court pointed out, the traditional 
measure of "consumer confusion" within a trademark infringement claim consists of a "nine 
factor" test.  The factors can include: (1) strength or distinctiveness of the mark; 
(2) similarity of the two marks to consumers; (3) similarity of the goods and services the 
marks identify; (4) similarity between the facilities used by the mark-holders; (5) similarity 
of advertising used by the mark-holders; (6) defendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; 
(8) quality of defendant’s product; (9) sophistication of the consuming public.  See id.  
Professor Goldman notes that "[e]ach federal circuit has developed its own set of factors to 
consider" for determining the likelihood of consumer confusion.  Goldman, supra note 21, at 
552–53.  Because the number of factors varies from circuit to circuit, the consumer 
confusion test is commonly referred to as "the multifactor likelihood of consumer confusion 
test" or "MFLOCC test."  Id.  For a summary of the common factors included in the 
MFLOCC test from circuit to circuit, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:29. 
 64. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 540–41. 
 65. Id. at 541. 
 66. Id. at 545. 
 67. Id. at 541. 
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stated that "evidence of [Google’s] financial gain alone is insufficient 
evidence of intent" to "trade on the Rosetta Stone Marks."68  Addressing the 
issue of actual consumer confusion, the court made two findings that 
derailed Rosetta Stone’s argument:  First, the court discounted Rosetta 
Stone’s reliance on prior case law,69 which it found distinguishable because 
"Rosetta Stone and Google are not direct competitors in the language-
learning software market."70  Second, the court concluded that survey 
evidence submitted by Rosetta Stone purporting to demonstrate actual 
consumer confusion was "de minimis."71 
Finally, on the issue of consumer sophistication, the court found the 
relevant segment of consumers to be "not the public at-large, but only 
potential buyers of [Rosetta Stone’s] products," whose sophistication the 
court concluded to be higher than average based on the nature and price of 
Rosetta Stone’s product.72  The court’s finding that the "expertise and 
sophistication" of Rosetta Stone’s potential customers tended "to 
demonstrate that they are able to distinguish between the Sponsored Links 
and organic results displayed on Google’s results page" was the final nail in 
the coffin of Rosetta Stone’s consumer confusion case.73 
Given the thorough and decidedly unequivocal treatment the court 
gave to Rosetta Stone’s direct trademark infringement case in the first half 
of its opinion, it is all the more surprising that Judge Lee felt the need to 
venture into the dim and shadowy realm of the functionality doctrine—an 
area usually reserved for trade dress analysis—to press his point.  And yet, 
this is exactly what he did.  After forcefully concluding that Rosetta Stone 
had no claim against Google for infringement based on consumer 
confusion, the court further indemnified Google against Rosetta Stone’s 
attacks by holding that Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks was 
functional, and thus noninfringing.74 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id.  The court made explicit an argument that Google has long advanced:  "In fact, 
it is in Google’s own business interest, as a search engine, not to confuse its users by 
preventing counterfeiters from taking advantage of its service.  Google’s success depends on 
its users finding relevant responses to their inquiries."  Id. at 542. 
 69. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(resolving a protracted trademark contest between the holders of the marks "L’eggs" and 
"Leg Looks"). 
 70. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 544. 
 73. Id. at 545. 
 74. See id. ("Notwithstanding a favorable finding for Google under the relevant 
infringement elements, the functionality doctrine protects Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone 
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C.  Examining the Application of the Functionality Doctrine to Word Marks 
In supporting its application of the functionality doctrine to word 
marks,75 the court in Rosetta Stone relied primarily on two cases for 
precedent.76  The first was Sega Enterprises v. Accolade,77 in which "the 
Ninth Circuit held the use of an initialization sequence that caused 
plaintiff’s trademark to be displayed on the screen was . . . a functional 
                                                                                                                 
Marks as keyword triggers."). 
 75. See Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc., Opp’n No. 91117894, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 464, 
at *7 (Oct. 26, 2005) (referring to trademarks that are words or phrases "shown in standard 
character form").  The term "word mark" is used merely to identify a trademark that is solely 
textual.  For instance, the word "Pepsi" is a word mark:  It is a word that has a trademark 
meaning.  The iconic blue and red Pepsi logo found on every can of Pepsi brand soda is a 
trademark but not a word mark.  To confuse the issue further, a term such as "Rosetta Stone" 
is a word mark because it has a trademark meaning.  However, unlike "Pepsi," the term 
"Rosetta Stone" has nontrademark meaning as well—for instance, it may also refer to the 
physical, historical artifact.  See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 3:2 (4th ed.) ("[T]he meaning of a word or symbol is not necessarily fixed for all time as it 
is first used, or as it is defined in the dictionary, but may grow and develop new meaning and 
nuances according to its use."). 
 76. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
("The keywords, therefore, have an essential indexing function because they enable Google 
to readily identify in its databases relevant information in response to a web user’s query."); 
see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
that use of the plaintiff’s trademark initialization sequence to achieve compatibility was 
functional because interoperability could not be achieved without the trademark sequence); 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1423 (S.D. Tex. 1995) 
(finding that the word "Compaq" inserted in computer code for purposes of compatibility 
was functional). 
 77. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademarked "initialization sequence" in its video 
game cartridges was a functional use).  In Sega, the court dealt with the issue of whether 
Sega, a videogame cartridge and console manufacturer, could "enjoin competing cartridge 
manufacturers from gaining access to its [gaming consoles]" through the use of an 
"initialization code" that was necessary for all cartridges to function in Sega consoles, but 
that also caused Sega’s trademark to briefly appear onscreen when a game started.  Id. at 
1514.  The court held that "when there is no other method of access to the [console] that is 
known or readily available to rival cartridge manufacturers, the use of the initialization code 
by a rival does not violate the [Lanham] Act even though that use triggers a misleading 
trademark display."  Id.  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California had 
granted Sega a preliminary injunction against Accolade to compel it to stop selling games 
that used Sega’s initialization code.  Id.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  Id.  In overturning 
the district court, the Ninth Circuit noted that the burden of "proving nonfunctionality [was] 
on Sega," and that Sega failed to "produce sufficient evidence regarding the existence of a 
feasible alternative" to Accolade’s use of its initialization code.  Id. at 1532.  As a result, the 
court concluded that the district court erred in granting Sega "preliminary injunctive relief 
under the Lanham Act," but the court left the door open to the possibility that Sega might be 
able to "meet its burden of proof at [a future] trial."  Id. 
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display of the trademark because using the initialization sequence was 
the only feasible means for providing compatibility with plaintiff’s 
product."78  The second case was Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom 
Technology,79 in which the District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
"merely held that a specific use of a word mark was functional because it 
was the only commercially viable way for the defendant to make its product 
compatible with the plaintiff’s computer program."80 
In making its comparison to Compaq and Sega, the Rosetta Stone court 
made two assertions.  First, it stated that Google’s use of trademarked terms 
as AdWords triggers was "no different than the use of a Google search 
query to trigger organic search results relevant to the user’s search."81  In 
doing so, the court declined to treat Google’s use of trademarks as triggers 
for organic search results and its use of trademarks as AdWords triggers as 
separate functions.82  The second step in the court’s logic was to conclude 
that "keywords"—both in the context of organic and sponsored results—
                                                                                                                 
 78. Autodesk, Inc. v. Dassault Systèmes Solidworks Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 
1009 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 79. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1423 
(S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that Procom Technology’s use of manufacturer Compaq’s 
trademarked "vendor identification" to enable Procom’s hardware products to interface with 
Compaq’s did not violate the Lanham Act because Procom’s use of the trademark was 
"purely functional").  The Compaq court considered whether Procom’s inclusion of 
competitor Compaq’s "vendor ID"—a code which "allows computers to identify themselves 
electronically to each other"—in its server hard drives’ software constituted trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act on the grounds that Compaq’s vendor ID contained 
within it the word "Compaq."  Id. at 1416.  Procom used the Compaq vendor ID in its hard 
drives so that they would be compatible with Compaq servers and would be recognized by 
Compaq’s server maintenance software, which informed customers when server hard drives 
were worn out and in need of replacement.  Id. at 1415–16.  The court noted that Compaq’s 
placement of its trademark, "Compaq," in its vendor ID was a voluntary decision and that 
Compaq should have recognized the potential for this action to "exclud[e] competitors from 
the market" or else force them to defend their use of the vendor ID in court.  Id. at 1423.  
The court found that, while Procom technically "used" the Compaq trademark in commerce, 
the use was a "purely functional" one.  Id.  Importantly, the court found that the Lanham Act 
does not protect functional product features and that "[t]his is true even when the functional 
feature is a trademark."  Id.  The court noted that the use of Compaq’s trademark in the 
vendor ID provided "compatibility" for Procom’s products, and that Compaq had not 
"established that there is any other commercially feasible method of achieving this desired" 
compatibility.  Id.  Ultimately, the court held that Procom was not liable for "trademark 
infringement or unfair competition," but found it liable for contributory copyright 
infringement based on other features of its products not discussed here.  Id. at 1423–26. 
 80. Autodesk, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (emphasis in original). 
 81. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 82. See id. (stating that "[i]n both cases, a search term like ‘Rosetta Stone’ will return 
a string of Sponsored Links and organic links on Google’s search results page"). 
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serve an "essential indexing function," within the framework of Google’s 
search technology.83  Implicit in the court’s analysis was the assumption 
that the sale of keywords to third parties through AdWords was the only 
commercially feasible way84 for Google to display "paid advertisements on 
its website."85  However, while relying on Sega and Compaq for support, 
the court did not explicitly claim that Google’s use of the protected marks 
was the only feasible way for Google to generate advertising revenue; 
instead, the court found that, were Google forbidden from using trademarks 
as triggers for AdWords, it might be forced to invent a more costly, less 
effective way of generating advertising revenue.86  This small difference 
between the Rosetta Stone court’s findings and the holdings of Sega and 
Compaq belies a fundamental misunderstanding of these two cases and 
establishes the foundation for the court’s erroneous conclusion that 
Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks was protected functional use. 
The great weight of trademark law’s doctrinal authority points to the 
idea that, in almost all instances, word marks—that is, words or phrases, 
"shown in standard character form,"87 that have been registered as 
trademarks—cannot be deemed "functional."88  Sega and Compaq, the only 
two cases the Rosetta Stone court cited for precedent in its functionality 
holding, comprise substantially the entire canon of case law supporting the 
idea that a word mark can be functional.89  Compaq and Sega constitute a 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See id. ("The keywords, therefore, have an essential indexing function because 
they enable Google to readily identify in its databases relevant information in response to a 
web user’s query."). 
 84. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(determining that in order to find a product feature functional a court should consider the 
several factors, including the "availability of alternative designs; and whether a particular 
design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacture," meaning a 
"commercially feasible alternative" exists (citations omitted)). 
 85. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 86. See id. ("Google would be required to create an alternative system for displaying 
paid advertisements on its website—a system which is potentially more costly and less 
effective in generating relevant advertisements."). 
 87. Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc., Opp’n No. 91117894, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 464, at 
*7 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2005). 
 88. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 
1030–31 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Nothing about the marks used to identify PEI’s products is a 
functional part of the design of those products."); Autodesk, Inc. v. Dassault Systèmes 
Solidworks Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[I]t is not apparent how a 
word mark could be essential to the use or purpose of an article or affect its cost or 
quality."). 
 89. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(citing Compaq and Sega as precedent for rule that functionality doctrine can apply to word 
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very limited, and perhaps unnecessary, exception to this general principle; 
but whether or not the exception is necessary, the facts of Rosetta Stone do 
not fall into this very small category.90  The Rosetta Stone decision muddies 
the functionality doctrine by advancing a mistaken interpretation of the 
doctrine’s application—forcing the facts of the case into an exceedingly 
narrow exception that does not properly apply.91 
The Rosetta Stone court failed to make the factual finding that Rosetta 
Stone’s marks were essential to Google in generating its advertising 
revenue; instead, the court satisfied itself with establishing that "keywords 
affect the cost and quality of Google’s AdWords Program."92  Rather than 
establishing that Google had no feasible commercial alternative other than 
appropriating the trademarks to sell AdWords, the court speculated that any 
restriction on Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks would merely be 
"more costly" to Google and "less effective" at generating advertising 
revenue.93  Ultimately, the court cited the risk of reduced efficiency and 
effectiveness of Google’s search technology as a whole,94 coupled with 
reduced consumer choice and value, as a final justification for Google’s 
right to sell Rosetta Stone’s marks to its competitors.95  While the court’s 
concerns were legitimate, it failed to grasp that functionality must be 
assessed in relation to the mark itself and the "generic" use of that mark, not 
the particular use or user in question.96  It is for this reason that Sega and 
                                                                                                                 
marks); Autodesk, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (same); Falcon Stainless, Inc. v. Rino Cos., 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102442 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (citing Compaq alone as precedent for 
rule that functionality doctrine can apply to word marks); Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030 n.46 
(same). 
 90. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 19 ("Although, as the District Court noted, courts 
in a handful of cases have applied the functionality doctrine to word marks, in those cases it 
was the plaintiff’s own use of their trademarks in a functional manner that justified the 
application of the functionality doctrine."). 
 91. See Autodesk, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (noting that Compaq and Sega both hold 
that the "use of a word mark was functional because," in each case, it represented the "only 
feasible means for providing compatibility with [the opposing party’s] product"). 
 92. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (finding that Google’s AdWords "benefit consumers who expend the time 
and energy to locate particular information, goods, or services, and to compare prices"). 
 95. See id. ("If Google is deprived of this use of the Rosetta Stone Marks, consumers 
would lose the ability to rapidly locate potentially relevant websites that promote genuine 
Rosetta Stone products at competitive prices."). 
 96. See, e.g., Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) 
(concluding that a product feature is functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article"); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 
514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks 
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Compaq stand as such stark exceptions to the general rule:  In those cases 
the courts allowed the offending party’s "use" to be labeled as "functional," 
so as to afford them protection under the functionality doctrine.97  However, 
"functional use," as it is often characterized, is a misnomer because 
functionality is theoretically inherent in a trademark (a functional feature of 
a product’s packaging, for instance, or a functional element on a piece of 
furniture), not dependent on its user.98 
D.  Functional Features or Functional Use? 
In contrast to the Rosetta Stone court’s misapplication of the 
functionality doctrine, the Ninth Circuit, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Netscape Communications Corp.,99 examined a similar use of word marks 
in Internet advertising and came to the conclusion that the functionality 
doctrine was not applicable to protect an Internet service provider’s sale of 
                                                                                                                 
to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature."); Sega Enters. Ltd. 
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n order to establish 
nonfunctionality the party with the burden must demonstrate that the product feature serves 
no purpose other than identification." (citations omitted)). 
 97. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1531 ("The [trademark within the] TMSS initialization code 
is a functional feature of a Genesis-compatible game and Accolade may not be barred from 
using it." (emphasis added)); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 
1409, 1423 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("[I]n this context, Compaq’s trademark is not protectable 
because its use is purely functional." (emphasis added)). 
 98. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 33 ("[A] feature is . . . functional when it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device."). 
 99. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1031 (holding that the functionality doctrine is not applicable 
to protect an Internet service provider’s sale of trademarked terms as "banner ad" triggers).  
In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit considered whether to reverse the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment as to plaintiff’s trademark infringement and dilution action in favor of 
defendant Internet provider.  Id. at 1030–31.  The court found that issues of material fact 
precluded the granting of summary judgment and reversed the district court.  Id. at 1031.  
Plaintiff Playboy Enterprises brought suit against Netscape, an Internet provider, on the 
grounds that Netscape infringed and diluted Playboy’s trademarks by including them in a 
basket of terms that third-party advertisers could buy to trigger "banner ads" that appeared 
when Internet users searched for one of the trigger terms using Netscape’s search engine.  Id. 
at 1022–23.  The Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that defendant’s functionality doctrine 
defense to plaintiff’s infringement claim failed because "[n]othing about the marks used to 
identify [Playboy’s] products [was] a functional part of the design of those products."  Id. at 
1030–31.  The court concluded, "[b]ecause we are not dealing with defendants’ wish to 
trademark their computer program, but with [Playboy’s] ability to protect the trademarks it 
already uses to identify its products, the doctrine of functional use does not help defendants 
here."  Id. at 1031. 
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trademarked terms as "banner ad" triggers.100  Referring to the doctrine as 
"functional use," rather than "functionality," and relying on Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co.,101 which was the most current Supreme Court 
ruling on the functionality doctrine at the time (and which is still good law), 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[n]othing about the marks used to identify 
[Playboy’s] products is a functional part of the design of those products."102 
A number of factual circumstances distinguish Playboy from Rosetta 
Stone; however, none of them render the functionality analysis in Playboy 
inapplicable to the facts of Rosetta Stone:  The Internet advertising involved 
in Playboy was "banner advertising" instead of AdWords,103 and defendants 
"require[d] adult-oriented companies to link their ads to [a] set of words" 
that included Playboy’s word marks.104  Crucially, the Playboy court held 
that "the doctrine of functional use does not help defendants here" because 
"[t]he fact that [Playboy’s] marks make defendants’ computer program 
more functional is irrelevant."105  The court went on to explain that 
"defendants might conceivably be unable to trademark some of the terms 
used in their program because those terms are functional within that 
program."106  The court emphasized that the "functionality" of a trademark 
is assessed in relation to the mark itself, not the particular defendant’s use 
of the mark.107 
Although the Ninth Circuit decided Playboy in 2004, before the 
landmark Traffix108 decision, and although six years is an eternity in the 
development of Internet technology, the functionality analysis in Playboy is 
still the correct one because it focuses on the plaintiff’s mark itself, not the 
defendant’s use of the mark, to assess functionality.109  The court in Rosetta 
Stone misconstrued the meaning of "use" in the term "functional use," 
finding that, because Google’s use of the mark was functional to Google, it 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 1030–31. 
 101. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–66 (1995). 
 102. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030–31. 
 103. Id. at 1023. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1031. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001) 
(providing the Supreme Court’s most recent treatment of the functionality doctrine, 
primarily as applied to trade dress). 
 109. But cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 818–20 (critiquing strongly the 
Playboy court’s initial interest confusion analysis). 
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was protected.110  Assuming that Google were enjoined from selling 
trademarked terms for use as AdWords triggers, such an injunction might, 
as the Rosetta Stone court feared, result in the reduced ability of consumers 
"to rapidly locate potentially relevant websites that promote genuine 
Rosetta Stone products at competitive prices."111  However, this is not a 
problem that trademark law’s functionality doctrine is meant to fix.112 
One need look no further for persuasive support of this contention than 
the amicus brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit by the International 
Trademark Association (INTA), supporting Rosetta Stone’s request to 
vacate the district court’s judgment, but taking no position on which party 
should prevail on the merits.113  As the INTA Brief succinctly states, the 
functionality doctrine is meant to "prevent a producer from using trademark 
law, instead of patent law, to monopolize useful product features."114  
Calling the district court’s ruling a "radical reinterpretation of the 
functionality doctrine," the INTA Brief distinguishes between the proper 
application of the functionality doctrine, as a "defense to infringement in 
circumstances in which the defendant has used a ‘functional’ and therefore 
unprotectable element of plaintiff’s trade dress," and the court’s incorrect 
application of the doctrine to immunize a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
mark because the mark serves "a useful or functional role" in defendant’s 
product.115 
The INTA brief strikes at the heart of the issue surrounding the 
functionality of word marks.  If the functionality doctrine is meant to 
prevent a mark-holder’s patent-like protection of a useful, "engineering-
type" product feature through trademark registration, it is difficult to see 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
("The keywords, therefore, have an essential indexing function because they enable Google 
to readily identify in its databases relevant information in response to a web user’s query."). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 7:64 (noting that "the test of what is 
‘functional’ should be very similar to that of patent law").  McCarthy explains that 
"‘functional’ features or designs should be defined as those that are driven by practical, 
engineering-type considerations such as making the product work more efficiently, with 
fewer parts and longer life, or with less danger to operators, or be shaped so as to reduce 
expenses of delivery or damage in shipping.  Under this rationale, these kind of utilitarian 
considerations should form the basis for the determination of what is ‘functional.’"  Id. 
 113. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 1 ("Although INTA does not take a position on 
the question of whether Rosetta Stone has a valid claim against Google, it supports Rosetta 
Stone’s request to vacate the decision because the district court misstated and misapplied 
settled trademark law on the issues of functionality and dilution."). 
 114. Id. at 13. 
 115. Id. at 17. 
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how the doctrine can be used to validate a defendant’s voluntary use of a 
plaintiff’s word mark unless the doctrine is viewed so expansively as to be 
meaningless.116  If Google’s use of the term "Rosetta Stone" is functional, 
what precise product feature of the "Rosetta Stone" mark makes it so?  At 
the risk of delving too deeply into the realm of the metaphysical, one can 
question whether all written or spoken words used to identify a brand or 
trademark-holder are functional.117  In a certain sense, any written word is 
functional linguistically, in that it is connotative,118 but of course this is not 
the type of functionality that trademark law’s functionality doctrine was 
created to protect.119  Putting aside metaphysical concerns for the moment, 
a brief hypothetical application of the Rosetta Stone court’s vision of the 
functionality doctrine to Google’s new Google Goggles technology reveals 
the pitfalls of interpreting the doctrine too broadly and demonstrates the 
need to approach Google’s use of trademarks in a different way. 
IV.  Rosetta Stone v. Google’s Unintended Consequences 
A.  The "New" Functionality Doctrine’s Infinite Scope 
Imagine a successor to the Google Goggles technology, which, as 
hypothesized in Part II, will allow individuals to use virtually all sensory 
stimuli—images, sounds, videos, smells, perhaps even tastes—as inputs for 
Google’s search engine.120  The user will capture the search input with his 
or her smartphone, transmit it to Google, and Google will return a list of 
search results based on the input, some of which will be organic and some 
                                                                                                                 
 116. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 7:64. 
 117. See KARL BÜHLER, THEORY OF LANGUAGE:  THE REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTION OF 
LANGUAGE, at liii (Donald Fraser Goodwin trans., John Benjamins Publ’g Co. 1990) (1934) 
("Language is related to the tool; it, too, is one of the implements used in life, it is an 
organon like the material implement . . . ."). 
 118. See JOHN STUART MILL, SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 22 
(Cosimo, Inc. 2008) (1886) ("By enabling [a man] to identify . . . individuals, we may 
connect them with information previously possessed by him; by saying, This is York, we 
may tell him that it contains the Minster.  But this is in virtue of what he has previously 
heard concerning York; not anything implied in the name."). 
 119. See supra notes 109–16 and accompanying text (discussing the Rosetta Stone 
court’s misappropriation of the functionality doctrine to allow Google’s free use of the 
Rosetta Stone marks). 
 120. See supra Part II.C (discussing the search potential of Google Goggles and its 
successor technologies). 
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of which will be sponsored.121  Just as with its current AdWords program, 
Google will have sold discrete potential search inputs to third-party 
advertisers so that, for instance, when a user takes a picture of the iconic 
John Deere "leaping deer" logo122 with his or her smartphone and runs a 
search based on that image, an advertisement for a third-party retailer that 
sells John Deere tractors may be displayed in the sponsored results section 
of the search results page.123 
In the Rosetta Stone court’s vision of the functionality doctrine, all 
such inputs—their number and kind limited only by human imagination 
and the leading edge of search technology—become functional because 
they are integral to the search engine’s operation.124  By using Google 
Goggles, the image of a brand logo from a soda can or a video clip from a 
television ad, captured with a smartphone’s camera, are both functional 
because the search engine uses those inputs to generate search results.125  
While the focus of this Note is on trademarks, the functionality doctrine 
could apply with the same effect to copyright:  A snippet of a popular 
song captured from the radio, a movie clip captured in a theater, images of 
fine art taken at a gallery—each of these items is "functional," in a sense, 
because companies like Google rely on them to generate their search 
results.126  The Google Goggles example demonstrates the way in which, 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See How Search Ads Works, supra note 26 (noting that Google’s organic search 
results are always displayed on the left-hand side of the results page, while advertisements 
are displayed, if at all, on the top and right-hand side of the page). 
 122. See History of the John Deere Trademark, JOHN DEERE, http://www.deere.com 
/wps/dcom/en_US/corporate/our_company/about_us/history/trademarks/trademarks.page 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) ("One of the world’s most recognized corporate logos, the 
leaping deer trademark has been a symbol of quality John Deere products for more than 135 
years.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1339–40 (detailing the process by which third-
party advertisers bid for and acquire search terms through the AdWords program). 
 124. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that, under the Rosetta Stone court’s 
interpretation of the functionality doctrine, "Google’s use of . . . marks as part of its method 
of delivering advertisements [is] functional," and Google is "therefore insulated . . . from 
liability"). 
 125. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(determining that the "essential indexing" role played by trademarked keywords in Google’s 
search databases renders them "functional" and leaving open the possibility of applying such 
reasoning just as easily to images, movies, or a variety of other search inputs in the future). 
 126. See 3 ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOR. & DOM. OPS. § 12:23 (2010) ("Elements of 
expression, even if embodied in useful articles, are copyrightable if capable of identification 
and recognition independently of the functional ideas that make the article useful.") (quoting 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intern., 740 F. Supp. 37, 58 (D. Mass. 1990)).  For 
a hint of the potential for copyright functionality issues presented by search engine 
technology, see ART PROJECT, POWERED BY GOOGLE, www.googleartproject.com (last visited 
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when every word, phrase, image, or sound is a potential search input, and 
a trademark’s "functionality" is based on whether it is "essential" to a 
search engine’s search function, the functionality doctrine becomes all-
encompassing.127 
In one sense, all trademarks are "functional" because they identify a 
product, brand, or producer; indeed, this is trademark law’s purpose.128  
But because Rosetta Stone’s interpretation of the functionality doctrine 
shifts the relevant inquiry from the plaintiff’s mark to the defendant’s use 
of that mark, the possible universe of "functional" marks becomes infinite, 
limited only by ever-evolving search engine technology.129  The Rosetta 
Stone court’s key finding on the functionality issue was that "keywords," 
which included plaintiff’s marks, serve "an essential indexing function" in 
the search engine software and enable "Google to readily identify in its 
databases relevant information in response to a web user’s query."130  As 
search technology moves beyond "keywords," and into "key-images" and 
"key-sounds," there will be no way to determine when a feature of a 
trademark or logo is an "essential" product feature except by looking at a 
defendant search engine’s use of that mark;131 and, if the mark serves as 
an essential input for the search engine, the use will be deemed functional 
and noninfringing.132  This interpretation shifts the functionality analysis 
from a focus on the plaintiff’s product or trademark itself to the 
defendant’s particular use of that product or mark.133  This is a corruption 
                                                                                                                 
Oct. 10, 2011). 
 127. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 128. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 3:2 (noting that trademarks serve "to identify 
one seller’s goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others" and "to signify that all 
goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled by a single, albeit anonymous, 
source"). 
 129. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (basing keywords’ functionality on the 
fact that "they enable Google to readily identify . . . relevant information in response to a 
web user’s query" and leaving the door open for the application of that same standard to 
non-textual search inputs, including those not yet technologically feasible). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (holding 
that a product’s feature is functional if the feature is essential to use or purpose or affects 
cost or quality).  But see INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 9–10 (noting that the Rosetta Stone 
court focused its functionality analysis almost solely on Google’s need to use the Rosetta 
Stone marks and ignore the nature of the marks themselves). 
 132. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 7:63 ("For ‘functional’ items, no amount of 
evidence of secondary meaning or actual confusion will create a right to exclude."). 
 133. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 9 ("[I]n a radical reinterpretation of the 
functionality doctrine, the District Court considered whether the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s marks serves a useful or functional role, in which case, the Court held, it would be 
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of the doctrine with serious implications for mark-holders and consumers 
alike.134 
However, a perhaps more serious problem with the functionality 
doctrine lies beyond the isolated misinterpretation at issue in Rosetta Stone.  
The doctrine as a whole, even when applied correctly in the forum for 
which it was originally intended, is ailing.135  The functionality doctrine is 
in flux to say the least and has been declared "collapsed" by at least one 
legal scholar.136  Between its unfitness for infringement claims in the 
Internet search engine context and its uncertain future as a trademark law 
doctrine, the functionality doctrine is an inapt and severely flawed solution 
to the questions presented in Rosetta Stone. 
B.  The Functionality Doctrine’s Uncertain Future 
The two cases relied on by the Rosetta Stone court to lay out its 
functionality doctrine holding are Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc. and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.137  Traffix is the 
more recent of the two cases and represents the Supreme Court’s latest 
treatment of the functionality doctrine in a trademark context.138  
Unfortunately, the Traffix decision has also been widely condemned for 
eviscerating the functionality analysis universally relied upon before the 
Court’s decision and replacing it with mass uncertainty and confusion, 
resulting in conflicting holdings among the federal circuit courts on the 
proper functionality standard.139  Without delving too deeply into the policy 
                                                                                                                 
immunized from a finding of infringement or counterfeiting."). 
 134. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 7:63 ("Functionality is a potent public policy, 
for it trumps all evidence of actual consumer identification of source and all evidence of 
actual consumer confusion caused by an imitator."). 
 135. See, e.g., Traffix, 532 U.S. at 29 ("[T]rade dress protection may not be claimed for 
product features that are functional." (emphasis added)); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 7:63 
("In order to accommodate trade dress law to the policies of patent law and of free 
competition, the common law early developed the policy that no trade dress or trademark 
rights could validly be claimed in ‘functional’ shapes or features." (emphasis added)). 
 136. Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality 
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 250 (2004). 
 137. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 545 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(citing Traffix and Qualitex). 
 138. See Harold R. Weinberg, An Alternate Functionality Reality, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
321, 323 (2010) ("The Supreme Court last addressed the functionality doctrine in Traffix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc."). 
 139. See Thurmon, supra note 136, at 244 ("The Traffix Court simply declared the 
existing law ‘incorrect,’ and replaced it with an unwieldy, unjustified, and unworkable set of 
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underlying the functionality doctrine, it is necessary to provide some 
background on the state of the doctrine after Traffix in order to show that, 
Internet or non-Internet context aside, continued application of the 
functionality doctrine to trademark infringement disputes involving search 
engines will result in inefficient and unpredictable legal outcomes. 
Prior to Traffix, the standard source for functionality doctrine guidance 
was Qualitex, in which the Court held that the functionality doctrine 
"prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting 
a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by 
allowing a producer to control a useful product feature."140  The Qualitex 
Court’s focus on "legitimate competition" was a restatement of the 
traditional functionality doctrine’s rationale—what legal scholars call the 
"competitive need functionality standard."141  The focus of this standard is 
on fostering fair competition and assuring the "availability of alternative 
designs" among competitors.142  A producer may not trademark a useful 
product feature if doing so means no "equally effective alternatives to [that] 
particular feature [are] available to competitors."143 
In Traffix, a case involving competing designs of portable traffic sign 
stands,144 the Court introduced a new "characterization issue into the 
functionality analysis:  Is a design feature useful or aesthetic?"145  As 
Professor Weinberg notes, this distinction over whether a product or mark’s 
feature is useful or aesthetic may be critical: 
The answer may control the availability of ‘alternatives analysis.’  
Under alternatives analysis, a design feature is nonfunctional and 
capable of being protected by trade dress law only if competitors have 
sufficient substitutes for it.  Traffix seems to rule out alternatives 
analysis for useful design features, but did not explicitly hold that useful 
design features are per se functional.  Therefore, Traffix may leave legal 
space for nonfunctional useful design features.  Traffix seems to permit 
                                                                                                                 
rules." (citations omitted)); Weinberg, supra note 138, at 323 ("Unfortunately, Traffix’s 
reviews have been terrible."). 
 140. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
 141. Thurmon, supra note 136, at 250. 
 142. Id. at 268. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 25 (describing the novel design features at issue in the 
case, which allow "[t]emporary road signs with warnings like ‘Road Work Ahead’ or ‘Left 
Shoulder Closed’" to "withstand strong gusts of wind"). 
 145. Weinberg, supra note 138, at 328 (citing myriad scholarly articles published in 
response to the Traffix Court’s decision, which characterized the ruling as "new and 
notable"). 
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alternatives analysis for aesthetic design features.  It clearly leaves legal 
space for nonfunctional aesthetic design features.146 
Scholarly opinion and court rulings have come to conflicting conclusions as 
to the true effect of the new aesthetic versus non-aesthetic feature 
distinction in functionality cases, even in the conventional area for the 
functionality defense—trade dress law.147  Some scholars have interpreted 
Traffix as a minor tweak to an already misunderstood body of 
jurisprudence, while others view Traffix as having obliterated what was 
coalescing into a clearly understood, albeit still developing doctrine.148  
Without offering an opinion on the ultimate impact of the Traffix ruling on 
functionality analysis in trade dress cases, one can safely speculate that 
removal of the doctrine from the trade dress context into the relatively 
uncharted realm of Internet-based trademark infringement claims will raise 
many more questions than it resolves.149 
The fact is that the functionality doctrine is in a state of turmoil, even 
within its historical "home base" of trade dress law.150  This uncertainty in 
the doctrine militates against appropriating it now, as the Rosetta Stone 
court did, to resolve the unsettled issues surrounding the rights of 
trademark-holders in infringement actions against search engine companies 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 328–29. 
 147. See, e.g., Walker & Zanger, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., 465 F. Supp. 2d 956, 965 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) opinion corrected and superseded by 549 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s functionality jurisprudence); Eco Mfg. LLC v. 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Traffix rejected an equation of 
functionality with necessity; it is enough that the design be useful."); Eppendorf-Netheler-
Hinz GmbH v. Ritter GmbH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Traffix supersedes the 
definition of functionality previously adopted by this court."); see also WILLIAM LANDES & 
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 198 (2003) 
(discussing aesthetic functionality); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, §§ 7:81, 7:82 (describing 
the aesthetic functionality distinction as "unwarranted and illogical"); STEPHEN F. MOHR & 
GLENN MITCHELL, FUNCTIONALITY OF TRADE DRESS:  A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF U.S. CASE 
LAW 151 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that, before Traffix, most courts analyzed both aesthetic and 
utilitarian functionality in the same way). 
 148. See Thurmon, supra note 136, at 246 (noting that some courts "have read Traffix 
as radically changing the law" by "equat[ing] functionality with utility, a standard very 
different from the competition-based standard used prior to Traffix"). 
 149. See Qualters, supra note 57 (quoting intellectual property law practitioners and 
parties to Rosetta Stone’s appeal who expressed concern that the district court’s legal "errors 
threaten to affect how [Internet trademark infringement] cases are resolved" and noted that 
courts need to "address what the [legal] standards should be" in these types of cases). 
 150. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasizing that "the functionality doctrine is 
used to determine whether the plaintiff’s trade dress serves a useful or functional role" 
(emphasis added)); supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty 
surrounding the functionality doctrine after the Traffix decision). 
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and other online entities.  With the functionality doctrine ill-suited to 
Internet-based infringement claims and ill-defined, even in its proper 
context, the courts must turn to a new doctrine to balance properly the 
rights of trademark-holders against the those of Internet search companies 
and consumers. 
V.  A New Way Forward:  Recasting Rosetta Stone v. Google 
A.  Identifying an Alternative to Functionality 
This Note’s central premise is that Rosetta Stone was rightly decided 
using the wrong legal justification.  As discussed in Part III, the court’s 
functionality analysis was superfluous when considered as part of its 
complete holding.151  Moreover, the analysis was flawed in its application 
of legal doctrine and carried with it destabilizing consequences for mark-
holders and search engine operators alike.152  To explain fully why, in light 
of the preceding critique of the court’s method, its overall result was 
correct, one must first establish what the Rosetta Stone court was 
attempting to achieve with its ruling. 
The court’s ultimate disposition of the relevant infringement issues 
shows that Judge Lee was attempting to give Google, and other search 
engine operators in its position, a limited right to freely use word marks, 
like the marks owned by Rosetta Stone, without fear of legal liability.153  
The court appeared to make an economic judgment that it is more efficient 
to let Google use such marks with relative freedom—because of the benefit 
to searchers from free, reliable organic search results—than it is to let 
mark-holders extend their trademark rights so far as to disallow search 
engine operators to use trademarks in a so-called "functional manner."154  
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part IV, the court’s ruling missed its mark 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Supra Part III.B. 
 152. Supra Part IV.A. 
 153. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 14 ("[T]he District Court appears to have been 
trying to recognize that some use of Rosetta Stone’s trademarks, as trademarks, might be 
appropriate both for Google and its advertisers . . . so that they could communicate they are 
resellers of Rosetta Stone’s products, or are making fair, comparative advertising 
claims . . . ."). 
 154. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 811 ("Like functionality or genericness, 
the key is to balance the search costs that will be imposed if we forbid relevant advertising 
against the search costs that might result from permitting that advertising and potentially 
confusing consumers."). 
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and went too far.155  By placing Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks 
under the umbrella of the functionality doctrine, the court in effect 
indemnified every search engine company from trademark infringement 
liability, provided the company can show that it uses the mark in a manner 
"essential" to its search process.156  A reworking of the district court’s 
conclusion is necessary to ensure that, in future trademark infringement 
actions against search engines, the rights of mark-holders, search 
companies, and consumers are equitably balanced.157 
In order to bring about the intended, but unrealized, effect of Judge 
Lee’s ruling, the crucial first step is to accurately characterize the nature of 
Google’s specific "use" of trademarks in the situation presented by Rosetta 
Stone.158  Acknowledging a growing trend in the federal courts, it is 
assumed for the purposes of this argument that a search engine’s use of 
trademarks in search-driven keyword advertising constitutes "use in 
commerce" under the Lanham Act.159  Assuming the general use of 
trademarks in search engine advertising is "use in commerce," the issue 
becomes how to specifically characterize trademark use by search 
engines.160  The INTA Brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit in the Rosetta 
Stone appeal provides a starting point for arguing that Google and other 
search engines’ use of trademarks is best characterized as "nominative fair 
use."161 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Supra Part IV.A. 
 156. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text (speculating that future search 
engine technology will render the Rosetta Stone court’s functionality analysis ineffective to 
protect mark-holders from search engines’ infringing uses of their trademarks). 
 157. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 779–82 (noting that, especially in the 
Internet context, recent court decisions have favored the interests of mark-holders too 
heavily over those of consumers, "search engines, directories, and other parties that use 
marks as classification tools"). 
 158. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
("Rosetta Stone . . . alleg[es] that Google, through its AdWords Program, is helping third 
parties to mislead consumers and misappropriate the Rosetta Stone Marks by using them as 
keyword triggers for Sponsored Links and using them within the text or title of the 
Sponsored Links."). 
 159. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1395 (noting that courts outside the Second 
Circuit have found arguments to the contrary "unpersuasive").  Contra Goldman, supra note 
21, at 593–94 (proposing that "[s]earch providers could be immunized from [infringement] 
liability using a rigorous definition of trademark ‘use’ under the Lanham Act" and arguing 
that "[s]earch providers do not ‘use’ a trademark regardless of the editorial role" they play). 
 160. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 554–58 (explaining that most trademark uses by 
search engines are "referential" or "associative"). 
 161. INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 6. 
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B.  Nominative Fair Use:  A Better Path to the Right Result 
The doctrine of nominative fair use, originally developed by the Ninth 
Circuit, protects an otherwise infringing party’s 
right to use another’s trademark, such as in comparative advertising, as 
long as: (1) the product or service in question is one not readily 
identifiable without the use of the trademark, (2) the use of the mark or 
marks is only so much as is reasonably necessary to identify the product 
or service, and (3) the user does not do anything that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.162 
As the Ninth Circuit explained in New Kids on the Block v. News America 
Publishing,163 "[a] trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, 
phrase, or symbol."164  Trademark-holders do not hold property rights in 
their marks "in gross"165—the right in a trademark is, by definition, limited 
to "[p]reventing producers from free-riding on their rival’s marks."166  The 
doctrine of nominative use comes into play "where [a] mark is used only ‘to 
describe the goods or services of [a] party, or their geographic origin.’"167  
The doctrine’s purpose is to prevent trademarks from functioning as 
"exclusive rights" to a word or forbidding "a trademark registrant to 
appropriate a descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others 
from accurately describing a characteristic of their goods."168 
The nominative fair use doctrine was applied in New Kids on the Block 
to protect defendant newspaper companies’ use of the trademarked name 
"New Kids on the Block" to describe plaintiff mark-holders, a popular 
band, in fan surveys published by the newspaper companies.169  Fans were 
asked to vote for the band member they found "the sexiest" by calling the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 15–16 (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 
302, 306–08 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 163. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that a newspaper company’s use of a popular musical band’s trademarked 
name was "nominative fair use" and thus noninfringing); Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding, on similar 
grounds, that Volkswagen could not prevent an automobile repair shop from using its mark). 
 164. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306. 
 165. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 788. 
 166. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. 
 167. Id. at 306 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (emphasis added)). 
 168. Id. (citing Soweco Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 169. Id. at 304–05. 
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newspapers’ "900 area code number[s]" to cast their votes.170  The 
newspapers, which made a profit on each call to the 900 numbers, then 
printed the results of the telephone survey, which required repeatedly using 
the band’s trademarked name.171 
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court’s ruling on the 
trademark infringement issues,172 found no evidence that the defendants did 
anything to suggest endorsement of the surveys by New Kids on the 
Block.173  Neither did the defendants, in the circuit court’s view, make any 
more reference to the plaintiffs’ trademarks than was "necessary to identify 
[plaintiffs] as the subject of the polls."174  The thrust of the Ninth Circuit’s 
argument with respect to the nominative fair use defense was that "a 
problem closely related to genericity and descriptiveness is presented when 
many goods and services are effectively identifiable only by their 
trademarks."175  The court expressed concern that, were a "trademark 
holder . . . allowed exclusive rights in such use, the language would be 
depleted in much the same way as if generic words were protectable."176  
The Ninth Circuit’s solution to the problem was to endorse the doctrine of 
nominative fair use, ensuring that descriptive uses of trademarks would be 
granted broad protection in the future.177 
Since the Ninth Circuit’s New Kids on the Block decision, the 
nominative fair use doctrine has been reaffirmed and refined in that 
circuit,178 explicitly adopted in the Third Circuit,179 adopted in part in the 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 309 ("Summary judgment was proper as to the first seven causes of 
action because they all hinge on a theory of implied endorsement; there was none here as the 
uses in question were purely nominative."). 
 173. See id. at 308 ("While plaintiffs’ trademark certainly deserves protection against 
copycats and those who falsely claim that the New Kids have endorsed or sponsored them, 
such protection does not extend to rendering newspaper articles, conversations, polls and 
comparative advertising impossible."). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 306. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 308 (holding that descriptive use of a trademarked name is "nominative 
fair use" and thus noninfringing). 
 178. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (finding the New Kids test for nominative fair use to be controlling, but noting 
that "[w]e apply a slightly different test for confusion in the nominative use, as opposed to 
the fair use, context"). 
 179. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 
2005) ("Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use cases."). 
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Fifth and Sixth Circuits,180 and adopted in principle, though not in name, in 
the Second Circuit.181  The holding of the Second Circuit in Tiffany v. 
eBay182 is of particular relevance for the issue of search engine advertising 
because it represents the most recent instance of an appellate court’s 
applying the nominative fair use doctrine (in principle at least) to an 
Internet-based defendant.183  The Second Circuit’s holding also represents 
an attractive option for the Fourth Circuit as it considers the Rosetta Stone 
appeal—the possibility of hewing to the spirit of the nominative use 
doctrine without explicitly following the Ninth Circuit’s holding in New 
Kids on the Block.184 
In Tiffany, the Second Circuit considered whether defendant Internet 
auction company’s use of plaintiff jewelry manufacturer’s trademark in 
"advertisements on its website and in connection with sponsored links 
purchased from search engines" violated trademark laws.185  Plaintiff 
Tiffany and Co., a world-renowned jeweler, was concerned that eBay was 
encouraging the sale of counterfeit Tiffany products on its website through 
the advertisement of its members’ ongoing auctions of purportedly genuine 
Tiffany-brand merchandise.186  Tiffany sued eBay alleging "trademark 
infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising," and the district 
court found "in favor of eBay on all claims."187  Restating the basic 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 
2003) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit’s analysis directly and applying the 
conventional "likelihood of confusion" test instead); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 
F.3d 526, 546 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use test in 
part). 
 181. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010) ("We have 
recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is 
necessary to describe plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or 
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant."). 
 182. See id. (holding, based on nominative fair use-like analysis, that defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s trademark in online advertising was a noninfringing use). 
 183. See id. at 96–97 ("eBay is the proprietor of www.ebay.com, an Internet-based 
marketplace that allows those who register with it to purchase goods from and sell goods to 
one another."). 
 184. See id. at 102 (noting that the Second Circuit has "referred to the [nominative fair 
use] doctrine, albeit without adopting or rejecting it" and concluding that the court "need not 
address the viability of the doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s claim" in favor of eBay). 
 185. Brief of eBay Inc. and Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-2007 (4th Cir. Nov. 1, 2010), 126-1 [hereinafter 
eBay Brief]. 
 186. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 95 ("Tiffany has instituted this action against eBay, 
asserting various causes of action . . . arising from eBay’s advertising and listing practices."). 
 187. Id. at 95–101. 
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principles of the nominative fair use defense, the Second Circuit held that 
eBay’s use of the Tiffany marks was noninfringing use "so long as there is 
no likelihood of confusion about the source of [the] defendant’s product or 
the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation."188 
Without addressing "the viability of the doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s 
claim," the court concluded:  (1) that "a defendant may lawfully use a 
plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s 
product and does not imply a false affiliation of endorsement by the 
plaintiff of the defendant"; (2) that "eBay used the [plaintiff’s] mark to 
describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its 
website"; and (3) that "none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that 
Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its products 
through eBay’s website."189 
In affirming the lower court’s trademark infringement ruling in favor 
of eBay, the Second Circuit discussed at length the nature of the "use" eBay 
was making of Tiffany’s mark.  eBay used the Tiffany mark in 
advertisements on its own site and on search engine sites, like Google and 
Yahoo!, to advertise the fact that eBay featured a number of merchants who 
traded in Tiffany merchandise.190  Tiffany’s main complaint about eBay’s 
use of the mark came down to the fact that eBay "knowingly" advertised 
members’ sales of counterfeit Tiffany products.191  Tiffany insisted that 
eBay was aware that a "significant portion" of the allegedly "Tiffany" 
sterling silver jewelry listed on its site was counterfeit and that eBay 
profited from every transaction completed through its website, including 
sales of counterfeit Tiffany goods.192  Therefore, Tiffany argued, eBay was 
using the Tiffany mark to mislead consumers into thinking the items for 
sale on eBay’s site were genuine, to encourage sales, and to generate more 
revenue for itself.193 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Id. at 102 (citing Merck Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 
402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).  The court noted that "[t]he Third Circuit treats the doctrine as an 
affirmative defense, while the Ninth Circuit views the doctrine as a modification to the 
likelihood-of-confusion analysis of the plaintiff’s underlying infringement claim."  Id. at 102 
n.7 (citations omitted). 
 189. Id. at 102–04. 
 190. Id. at 100–01. 
 191. Id. at 98. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. ("Reducing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, 
including genuine Tiffany pieces, through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least 
one sense:  It would diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany 
merchandise."). 
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The Second Circuit concluded that Tiffany’s trademark infringement 
claim against eBay suffered from a critical factual weakness:  eBay had 
taken numerous precautions and countermeasures to discourage the sale of 
counterfeit Tiffany products on its website and actively policed its sellers, 
going so far as to ban specific sellers from the site if they were deemed to 
be trafficking in counterfeit merchandise.194  Moreover, neither the fact that 
eBay generated revenue from "all sales of goods on its site"195 nor the fact 
that eBay may have had a "generalized knowledge"196 that there were 
counterfeit Tiffany goods being sold on its site was evidence of eBay’s 
wrongdoing because eBay "took affirmative steps to identify and remove 
illegitimate Tiffany goods" from its site.197  In short, the court concluded 
that, on the issue of trademark infringement, Tiffany was going after the 
wrong party.198  eBay, though making use of the Tiffany mark to identify 
sellers of Tiffany goods on its site, was using the mark merely to refer to 
Tiffany goods by name.  This allowed its users to locate quickly and 
efficiently the goods on eBay’s website.199  While counterfeiters could be 
held liable to Tiffany for trademark infringement, eBay could not because 
its use was nominative and fair, and thus protected.200 
Together, New Kids on the Block, Tiffany, and other recently decided 
nominative fair use cases201 stand for the principle that the "use of a 
trademark term to refer to a product originating from the trademark owner 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. ("Although eBay was generating revenue from all sales of goods on its 
site . . . the district court found eBay to have ‘an interest in eliminating counterfeit Tiffany 
merchandise from eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of its website as a safe place to do 
business.’"). 
 195. Id. at 98. 
 196. Id. at 107. 
 197. Id. at 103. 
 198. See id. ("We conclude that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark in the described manner 
did not constitute direct trademark infringement."). 
 199. See id. ("eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods 
offered for sale on its website."). 
 200. See id. at 102 (affirming the district court’s holding that defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s mark "was protected by the doctrine of ‘nominative fair use’"). 
 201. See 1 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW § 6.14[3] (2010) ("While 
not all circuits have specifically considered nominative fair use, it is fair to assume that even 
in the absence of controlling case law all circuits would recognize the concept of non-
trademark use."); see also Univ. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (recognizing the concept of non-trademark use); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 
Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan 
Tech., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 
155 F.3d 526, 547 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). 
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is not actionable."202  And Tiffany specifically concludes that trademark 
law, through the nominative use doctrine, "embraces the right of online 
services to engage in keyword advertising."203  In light of this burgeoning 
recognition of an online entity’s right to use trademarks in a nominative 
way, the facts of Rosetta Stone require fresh reconsideration to determine 
whether Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks is a nominative fair use. 
C.  Google’s Use Is Nominative 
In order to demonstrate that Google’s use—and by extension all search 
engines’ use—of Rosetta Stone’s marks is nominative, Google’s actions 
must be weighed against the standard test for nominative fair use, which, 
for purposes of this argument, will be the standard articulated in New Kids 
on the Block and presented for the Fourth Circuit’s consideration in the 
INTA amicus brief.204  In order for Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks 
to be nominative fair use: 
(1) [T]he product or service in question [may] not [be] readily 
identifiable without the use of the trademark, (2) the use of the mark or 
marks [may be] only so much as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service, and (3) the user [may] not do anything that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.205 
1.  Identifiability 
Google’s "use" of a search term (or other input), trademark or 
otherwise, begins when a user enters it into Google’s search engine.206  At 
this point, Google’s search algorithms compare the search input against 
databases of possible Internet results, using complex mathematical formulas 
and data generated by billions of searches to return organic search results to 
                                                                                                                 
 202. eBay Brief, supra note 185, at 8 (citations omitted). 
 203. Id. at 4. 
 204. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 15 (outlining the nominative fair use test as 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See THOMAS A. POWELL, WEB DESIGN:  THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 276–77 (2d ed. 
2002), available at http://www.webdesignref.com/chapters/09/ch9-01.htm#01 ("Depending 
on the search facility being used, the query formed by the user may vary greatly.  A simple 
query might include only keywords, like ‘Robot Butler.’  More complex queries might 
include Boolean queries like ‘Robot AND Butler.’"). 
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the user that have the highest likelihood of being relevant to his or her 
search query.207  In addition to organic search results, Google returns 
advertising in the form of sponsored links that correspond to the user’s 
search input and are thus deemed by Google more likely to be related to the 
user’s search needs or interests.208  In its search process, Google uses inputs 
from the "real world" to generate search results on the Internet:  It 
references real-world names, brands, photos, logos—many of them 
trademarked or copyrighted—because its users input these marks into its 
search engine.209 
Just like eBay, or the newspaper companies in New Kids on the Block, 
Google needs to be able to describe and compare various trademark and 
non-trademark inputs, given to it by users, in order to conduct its 
business.210  Google must be able to respond to users’ search inputs, many 
of which will carry trademark meaning.211  Focusing purely on its organic 
search results, Google’s use of marks is clearly nominative because Google 
operates as an online index of "real world" concepts.212  The search engine 
is using trademarked terms and comparing those terms against a database of 
possible relevant results.213  The products and services that users name with 
their inputs—be they Orvis, Pepsi, John Deere, or Tiffany—cannot be 
readily described without use of the marks.214 
                                                                                                                 
 207. See id. at 277 ("[T]he search engine builds as big a haystack as possible, then tries 
to organize the haystack somehow, and finally lets the user try to find the proverbial needle 
in the resulting haystack of information by entering a query on a search page."). 
 208. See How Search Ads Work, supra note 26 (explaining the process by which 
"sponsored links" are generated and displayed on Google’s search results page). 
 209. See eBay Brief, supra note 185, at 2 (noting that search engines "give users the 
ability to locate and purchase an almost unlimited array of products and services and to 
access information on any conceivable topic by simply typing a search term—a keyword or 
keywords—and pushing a button"). 
 210. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
("If Google is deprived of [the] use of the Rosetta Stone Marks, consumers would lose the 
ability to rapidly locate potentially relevant websites that promote genuine Rosetta Stone 
products at competitive prices."). 
 211. See eBay Brief, supra note 185, at 5 (explaining that "consumers searching for a 
specific company, good, service, or other piece of information without knowing the exact 
website address for that information will likely use a search engine to identify and locate it"). 
 212. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1400 ("Google’s index is dynamically created by 
its algorithms in response to user queries."). 
 213. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (noting that Google’s organic use of 
keywords, including trademarks, "enable[s] Google to readily identify in its database 
relevant information in response to a web user’s query"). 
 214. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 
1992) ("[O]ne might refer to ‘the two-time world champions’ or ‘the professional basketball 
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Indeed, the Rosetta Stone court’s justification for its functionality 
holding expressly condones Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks on the 
grounds that Rosetta Stone and its products cannot be readily identified 
without the use of its marks.  The court calls Google’s use of "trademarked 
keywords, including the Rosetta Stone Marks, to identify relevant 
Sponsored Links . . . no different than the use of a Google search query to 
trigger organic search results relevant to the user’s search."215  
"[A]dvertisers," the court continues, "rely on keywords to place their 
products and services before interested consumers," and because consumers 
search using names in common usage, such as a brand’s trademarked name, 
Google must use certain trademarks as keywords in order for its search 
engine to operate correctly.216 
Google’s sponsored results, driven by its AdWords program, are 
merely an alternative method for returning relevant search results to 
searchers.217  Whereas organic results are driven by algorithms, sponsored 
results are driven by the market.218  The highest bidders’ advertisements are 
the ones that will appear on any given search results page.219  In either case, 
however, a trademark used by a searcher to generate results is used to 
describe the thing itself.220  Its use to generate market-driven search results 
is no more or less a commercial use of the mark on Google’s part than it is 
when used to generate organic search results.221  Trademark law does not 
                                                                                                                 
team from Chicago,’ but it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the 
Chicago Bulls."). 
 215. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 216. Id.  Contrary to the court’s conclusion, this state of affairs does not render 
Google’s use "functional."  Id. 
 217. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1401–02 (using the analogy of white and yellow 
pages in a physical phonebook to describe Google’s left and right-hand search results 
columns). 
 218.  See Tan, supra note 26, at 476–77 ("In effect, an account holder ‘bidding’ on a 
keyword is competing for it with all other account holders who wish to use that keyword—
an account holder’s financial power thus plays a significant role in determining the degree of 
exposure his ad will receive."). 
 219. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1339 (noting that Google modeled its AdWords 
program on the technology developed by GoTo.com (which Google eventually acquired), 
which "ranked [search results] according to the amount of money each purchaser paid" for 
advertising). 
 220. See id. at 1362 (explaining that, outside of a word’s trademark use, the trademark-
holder does not "own any interest in the word . . . in the abstract"). 
 221. See id. at 1345–46. 
Google’s left-hand column is, in fact, subject to market forces in ways that can 
make it similar to the right hand column.  Businesses seeking consumer traffic 
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give mark-holders the right to restrict the use of their marks to describe 
their products, and nothing about the descriptive use of such names in the 
search engine context changes that result.222 
2.  Reasonable Necessity 
The nominative use doctrine’s requirement that search engines use 
only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary will put some 
limitation on search engine practices as search technology develops.223  
This differentiates the nominative use defense from the functionality 
doctrine as applied by the Rosetta Stone court.224  Instead of giving search 
engine companies carte blanche to use any form of trademark they can turn 
into a search input, the nominative use doctrine puts the burden on search 
companies to demonstrate that there is not a more limited way to use the 
trademark to generate search results.225  In the Rosetta Stone case, the use 
Google was making out of Rosetta Stone marks was as limited as 
possible—sales of the marks as textual keywords—but future search 
engines will use marks in a more expansive way.226 
For instance, a future court might determine that allowing searchers to 
use images of a unique product design or video of a compelling 
                                                                                                                 
realize that both columns are simply lists of links.  Being first in the left-hand 
column may provide more traffic to a site than paying for an AdWords 
advertisement. 
Id.; see also David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 
BU1 (reporting on the hugely profitable "search engine optimization" or "SEO" industry, 
which advises companies on ways to increase their websites’ rank in Google’s organic 
search results). 
 222. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) ("[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, rather 
than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use 
defense . . . ."). 
 223. See id. (allowing a defendant to claim the nominative fair use defense when "only 
so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product 
or service"). 
 224. See supra notes 124–35 and accompanying text (arguing that the Rosetta Stone 
court’s conception of the functionality doctrine gives search engines an unrestricted right to 
appropriate trademarks as search inputs). 
 225. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (treating the 
nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense to direct trademark infringement, 
placing the burden on the defendant to show that its use of plaintiff’s mark was protected). 
 226. See supra Part II.C (predicting the use of images, sounds, video, and other sensory 
inputs as search triggers). 
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advertisement as search inputs is more use than "reasonably necessary" to 
identify the trademark.  This is not to say that generating organic search 
results from such inputs would be forbidden, only that there might be 
limitations imposed on which inputs could be sold as "triggers" for 
sponsored links.227  In this way, search engines’ search functions can 
remain effective, mark-holders can retain some control of their trademarks 
in the search engine context, and consumers can continue to rely on the 
availability of relevant and efficient search results, regardless of the 
trademark or non-trademark nature of their queries.228 
Given the current limits on search technology, which require the vast 
majority of users to search using keywords exclusively, Google’s "use" of 
trademarks remains largely limited to what is reasonably necessary to 
identify the product or service queried—keywords.229  As discussed above, 
it is easy to view Google’s use of trademarks to generate organic results as 
a nominative use,230 and there is no reason to treat sponsored links 
differently.  Google’s incidental generation of advertising revenue by way 
of the search services it provides is not, under the conventional nominative 
use doctrine, a factor weighing against its successful deployment of the 
nominative fair use defense.231  As the New Kids on the Block and Tiffany 
courts held, a trademark-holder does not have the right to direct the 
disposable income of all possible consumers to products or services 
licensed by the mark-holder alone.232  The fact that a nominative user 
generates a profit from the use of a trademark is not dispositive, or indeed 
even indicative, evidence of trademark infringement.233  Advertising, 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1409 ("Trademark law cannot describe an optimal 
index to the Internet, given the fact that much of the information users seek and the problems 
they encounter are not matters where trademark law has much application."). 
 228. See id. (noting that "allowing trademark law to dominate the indexical value of 
search results poses serious risks:  [T]rademark meanings might usurp other understandings 
of terms"). 
 229. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that defendants who use mark-holders’ trademarks "only to the extent 
necessary to identify them," as for instance "the subject of [a] poll[]," and do not use a mark-
holder’s "distinctive logo or anything else that isn’t needed to make the announcements 
intelligible," meet the limited use requirement). 
 230. Supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 231. See New Kids, 917 F.2d at 309 ("Where, as here, the use does not imply 
sponsorship or endorsement, the fact that it is carried on for profit and in competition with 
the trademark holder’s business is beside the point." (citations omitted)). 
 232. See id. ("[T]rademark laws do not give [plaintiffs] the right to channel their fans’ 
enthusiasm (and dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by them."). 
 233. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
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through sponsored links, is both a source of revenue for Google and an 
alternative index of search results for searchers.234  So long as Google keeps 
its organic and sponsored search results clearly separated and is held 
accountable by consumers for its results-generating methods, there is no 
cognizable legal difference between Google’s use of trademarks in organic 
and sponsored results.235 
3.  No Indication of Endorsement or Sponsorship 
Google and other search engines that use keyword advertising are not 
engaging in practices that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by 
mark-holders.  The fact that a portion of all search results are "generated 
from the search engine’s algorithm" while the rest are "paid advertisements 
that are identified separately on the search results page[]" does not alter the 
nominative use analysis discussed above.236  Search advertisements are, by 
virtue of the AdWords program, placed "in front of consumers who identify 
themselves as interested in certain products or services offered by the 
advertisers’ companies."237  Additionally, mark-holders who bring 
infringement claims against search engines like Google for selling 
trademarked search terms to advertisers misunderstand both the motivations 
of the average Internet-searcher and the relationship between search 
engines and third-party advertisers.238 
Individuals search for many reasons:  If searchers input a query for 
"Starbucks," does that mean they are necessarily searching with the intent 
                                                                                                                 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) 
("[T]rademark owners cannot prevent others from making a descriptive use of their 
trademark.  While a trademark conveys an exclusive right to the use of a mark in 
commerce . . . that right generally does not prevent one who trades a branded product from 
accurately describing it by its brand name . . . ."). 
 234. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1344–45 (explaining the distinction between 
algorithm-driven, left-hand search results and market-driven, right-hand search results). 
 235. See id. at 1409 (noting that Google and other search engines must be held 
accountable for the way in which search results are displayed and identified and recognizing 
that "[a]llowing Google to completely control the indexical function of its search results 
might lead to public harm"). 
 236. eBay Brief, supra note 185, at 5. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 513 ("Search processes are complex and defy 
simplistic analysis.  Some searches are very simple and directed; other searches are open-
ended and meandering.  Thus, any attempt to describe a universal search process is 
inherently misleading."). 
LOST IN TRANSLATION 1547 
of purchasing Starbucks products as a direct result of their search?  
Oftentimes, the answer is no.239  To understand why this is so, it is 
necessary "to make a distinction between two different kinds of searches—
informational and commercial."240  As its name suggests, in an 
informational search, a searcher is looking for information about a concept 
and does not necessarily seek to transact any consumer business.241  The 
strictures of trademark law should have no bearing on these searches 
because "consumer confusion" is an impossibility:  The searcher is not a 
"consumer."242  This is not to say, however, that an informational search 
cannot regard a commercial product or involve a trademark.  To borrow an 
example from Professor Goldman’s exhaustively thorough treatment of this 
phenomenon—which he labels "objective opaqueness"—imagine that a 
searcher enters the term, "Canon PowerShot S400" (the name of a high-end 
camera) into a search engine.243  The user, and in turn the search engine, use 
the trademarks "Canon" and "PowerShot" to effectuate the search; the 
search seems commercial, but perhaps the searcher is already the proud 
owner of a PowerShot S400 and is merely searching for instructions on 
home camera-repair techniques.244 
On the other hand, the searcher may desire to buy a PowerShot S400, 
in which case the search could properly be labeled commercial and the 
searcher a potential consumer.  Once again, though, the full picture is 
obscured.  The searcher may be in the market for a used PowerShot from a 
third-party camera retailer or perhaps a leather case for his previously 
purchased PowerShot.245  In neither context does Canon, as the trademark-
holder, have a right to restrict the use of its mark.246  With no way of 
                                                                                                                 
 239. See id. at 521 ("Simply put, one cannot make any legally-supportable inferences 
about searcher objectives based on the keywords used."). 
 240. Segal, supra note 221, at BU1 (quoting Mark Stevens, the owner of a "black hat" 
search optimization company). 
 241. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 522–24 (listing a variety of possible informational 
search objectives, including for example "prepurchase information," "postpurchase 
information," "community information," "employment related information," "dictionary 
uses," and "typographical errors"). 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id. at 521 ("This Article refers to our inability to infer searcher’s objectives 
from their keywords as ‘objective opaqueness.’"). 
 244. See id. at 522 ( noting that "[t]he searcher may . . . be looking for postpurchase 
assistance, including customer support or repair or servicing information"). 
 245. See id. (detailing the many search objectives a searcher might have when 
searching for the name of a product aside from directly purchasing the product from the 
mark-holder). 
 246. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1362 (explaining that, outside of a word’s 
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knowing searchers’ search objectives, the line between a commercial search 
and an informational one becomes blurred, and the result is a glut of time-
consuming factual survey evidence (of questionable utility) to prove 
likelihood of confusion247 in trademark infringement claims against search 
engines.248 
The foregoing digression into the nature of searcher behavior shows 
that trademarks, as keywords, serve a search engine’s essential commercial 
and non-commercial functions alike.  Trademarks, when used as keywords, 
are not necessarily used in their commercial, trademark context.  As 
discussed above, searcher intent is virtually impossible to discern with 
precision, and the use of trademarks in AdWords advertising "comprehends 
a number of lawful, pro-competitive practices, such as the sale or resale of 
products bearing the trademarks; the sale of components, replacement parts, 
and compatible products; and the provision of non-competitive information 
about the goods or services corresponding to the trademarks."249  To deem 
use of these marks "inherently unlawful solely because third parties may 
make infringing uses of those trademarks in their advertisements" puts too 
much power in the hands of mark-holders and hurts consumers of Internet 
search services.250 
Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks fits neatly into the 
nominative fair use exception developed by the Ninth Circuit in New Kids 
on the Block.251  More broadly though, Google’s use is representative of an 
increasingly ubiquitous kind of trademark use particular to the Internet.252  
                                                                                                                 
trademark use, the trademark-holder does not "own any interest in the word . . . in the 
abstract"). 
 247. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 2:8 ("[T]he keystone . . . is the avoidance of a 
likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public.  Whatever route one travels . . . 
the signs give direction to the same enquiry—whether defendant’s acts are likely to cause 
confusion."). 
 248. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542–43 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (noting that the parties agreed that evidence of "actual confusion" was the "best 
evidence of likelihood of confusion" and that "Rosetta Stone’s evidence of actual confusion" 
consisted of "testimonies of five individuals out of more than 100,000 impressions over six 
years"). 
 249. eBay Brief, supra note 185, at 6. 
 250. Id. at 4. 
 251. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that a use that describes the trademark, is limited in scope, and does not 
imply sponsorship or endorsement by mark-holder is "nominative fair use" and noting that 
"the fact that it is carried on for profit and in competition with the trademark holder’s 
business is beside the point"). 
 252. Brief of Appellee at 21, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 29, 2010) (arguing that "referential [trademark] uses are inherently protected" in the 
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As technology evolves, Internet entities are claiming commercial roles that 
were once predominantly the domain of "brick and mortar" entities.253  The 
Rosetta Stone case demonstrates that courts need to carefully apply a mix of 
traditional and evolving trademark doctrines to keep the law effective and 
equitable when it comes to protecting the rights of mark-holders, search 
engine companies, and consumers.254  The nominative fair use doctrine 
achieves this balance. 
D.  A Roadmap for the Fourth Circuit 
Adopting the nominative fair use doctrine will bring the Fourth Circuit 
to the forefront of Internet intellectual property law and show that the 
Circuit understands the needs of the diverse stakeholders in the web-based 
economy.  While an explicit adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s New Kids on 
the Block standard is unnecessary to achieve what this Note contends is the 
correct result, the Fourth Circuit should, at the least, follow in the footsteps 
of the Second Circuit and acknowledge the validity of the principles 
underlying the nominative fair use doctrine.255 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has previously recognized as 
"important" the notion "that trademarks not be transformed from rights 
against unfair competition to rights to control language."256  If the Fourth 
Circuit reverses the district court’s trademark infringement holding in favor 
of Google, it risks "perpetuat[ing] [the] monopolies" that mark-holders 
continuously seek to gain on the use of their marks.257  Alternatively, if the 
Fourth Circuit upholds the district court’s ruling in its entirety, including its 
                                                                                                                 
search engine context and that "there is no need to evaluate the traditional fair use factors or 
adopt a multi-factored test as in New Kids on the Block"). 
 253. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 25:70.25 (explaining that "retailer placement 
of goods and retail promotions like coupons are traditional forms of legitimate advertising 
and that in cyberspace shopping, on-line intermediaries like GOOGLE and YAHOO have 
stepped into the role of the brick and mortar retailer"). 
 254. See Lastowka, supra note 13, at 1390 ("What is needed in this arena is a doctrine 
that keeps the role of trademark law in search results very limited, but does not abdicate the 
state’s role entirely."). 
 255. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
the Second Circuit has "referred to the [nominative fair use] doctrine, albeit without adopting 
or rejecting it" and concluding that the court "need not address the viability of the doctrine to 
resolve Tiffany’s claim" in favor of eBay). 
 256. CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted). 
 257. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 300 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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functionality doctrine analysis, it will be legitimizing "a radical 
reinterpretation of the functionality doctrine" with far-reaching and 
destabilizing consequences for mark-holders and consumers.258  Put bluntly, 
such a ruling would give Google and other search engine companies a 
license to run roughshod over the rights of mark-holders in the Internet 
context.259 
Whether it chooses to explicitly follow New Kids on the Block or not, a 
clear statement of the Fourth Circuit’s endorsement of nominative fair use 
principles is vital to resolve current uncertainty surrounding the validity of 
this doctrine in the Circuit.260  Because "at least two district courts" in the 
Fourth Circuit have expressed doubts about the current validity of the 
nominative fair use doctrine in the Circuit, an unequivocal endorsement of 
its principles is necessary to clear up the present state of ambiguity.261  
Having clearly established a nominative use defense to trademark 
infringement, the Fourth Circuit should, on remand, "direct the District 
Court to consider whether Google’s keyword practices are protected under 
the nominative fair use doctrine (rather than the functionality doctrine)."262 
A finding on remand that Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone marks is 
nominative fair use will not leave Rosetta Stone and other mark-holders 
without legal recourse.  A trademark-holder wishing to prevent infringing 
uses of its mark in the search engine advertising context has an obvious 
target for its legal action: the infringing third-party advertiser.  As the 
Second Circuit’s Tiffany decision explains, the true wrongdoer in the case 
of misleading or infringing Internet advertising is the advertiser itself.263  A 
paradigmatic example of the effectiveness of targeting advertisers rather 
than search engines is Binder v. Disability Group, Inc.,264 a case recently 
                                                                                                                 
 258. INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
 259. Supra Part IV. 
 260. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S & M Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588–89 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (suggesting that the nominative fair use doctrine may not be applicable in 
the Fourth Circuit); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Loompanics Enters., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 
1241 (D. Md. 1996) (same). 
 261. INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 15; see also cases cited supra note 260. 
 262. Id. at 14–15. 
 263. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2010) ("It is true 
that eBay did not itself sell counterfeit Tiffany goods; only the fraudulent vendors did, and 
that is in part why we conclude that eBay did not infringe Tiffany’s mark."). 
 264. See Binder v. Disability Grp., Inc., No. CV 07-2760-GHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7037 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (holding defendants liable for trademark infringement 
based on their use of plaintiffs’ trademark in "AdWords linked to their websites"). 
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decided in the Central District of California.265  In Binder, plaintiff law firm 
brought a trademark infringement action against defendants for using 
Google AdWords to purchase plaintiff’s trademark—"Binder and 
Binder"—as a trigger term and display misleading and potentially 
confusing advertisements that appeared as sponsored links when users 
searched for the term "Binder and Binder."266  Analyzing the defendants’ 
advertisements under a standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test,267 
the District Court found that the advertisements were infringing and 
awarded the plaintiff damages and attorney’s fees, based on the exceptional 
nature of the trademark infringement at issue.268 
Binder stands for the notion that leaving search engine companies out 
of AdWords-based trademark infringement actions does not preclude mark-
holders from vigorously protecting their marks and winning judgments 
against infringing online advertisers.269  The Fourth Circuit should adopt the 
nominative fair use doctrine to direct the focus of trademark infringement 
actions onto the parties responsible for the infringing advertising and allow 
search engines to continue using trademarks in a descriptive, noninfringing 
manner. 
The Fourth Circuit now charts a course between perilous shoals, with 
the threat of overly robust intellectual property rights for mark-holders on 
one side and the danger of total indemnification for search engines in 
trademark infringement actions on the other.  Although not a perfect 
solution, the doctrine of nominative fair use should guide the court’s 
way.270  By ruling that search engines have a right to use trademarks in both 
organic and sponsored search results, the court will ensure that mark-
holders are not inadvertently granted a total monopoly on the online use of 
their trademarks.271  Simultaneously, by virtue of the nominative fair use 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See id. at *3–4 (noting that plaintiffs brought suit solely against defendant 
advertisers and not against Google, the search engine operator that sold defendant the 
AdWords trigger terms). 
 266. Id. at *5. 
 267. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the multi-factor likelihood 
of confusion test for trademark infringement claims, also known as the "MFLOCC test"). 
 268. See Binder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7037, at *32 ("An award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs may be made in ‘exceptional cases’ of trademark infringement."). 
 269. See id. at *38 ("We further award Plaintiffs enhanced damages in the amount of 
double the lost profits of a total of $292,235.20."). 
 270. See INTA Brief, supra note 6, at 15 ("This appeal thus provides [the Fourth 
Circuit] with an appropriate opportunity to expressly consider the nominative fair use 
doctrine."). 
 271. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 10, at 788 ("Overly restrictive trademark law has 
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doctrine’s requirement that protected trademark use be limited to 
"reasonable necessity," the court will provide mark-holders a tool with 
which to keep search engines from ignoring trademark rights.272  The stated 
goal of this Note’s proposal for the Fourth Circuit is balance:  The rights of 
mark-holders must be balanced against the rights of search engine 
companies and consumers.273  The nominative fair use doctrine represents 
the best judicial expression of that balance to date.  The Fourth Circuit 
should join the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits in leading the legal 
system’s charge forward into the new digital age. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The Rosetta Stone case comes at a unique moment for the legal system 
as it strives to keep pace with the never-ceasing march of Internet 
technology.  The implications of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling will reach far 
beyond its immediate jurisdiction.  As Google and its competitors grow and 
evolve, the trademark infringement issues facing courts will only become 
more complex—a fact made starkly clear by the arrival of Google Goggles 
and its successor technologies. 
The district court’s Rosetta Stone holding represents a good faith effort 
to confront the emerging trademark issues that accompany the rapid 
advance of search technology.  While the spirit of the court’s decision is in 
the right place, its resolution of the trademark infringement issue through 
reliance on a misreading of the functionality doctrine renders the legal 
analysis of the court’s ruling an unfit foundation for future precedent in 
search engine cases. 
The Fourth Circuit is now poised to repair the district court’s legal 
errors while preserving the progressive spirit of Judge Lee’s ruling.  The 
appeals court has the tools—in the form of the nominative fair use 
doctrine—to do this; it merely needs to commit to being a leader in the 
arena of Internet-based intellectual property law.  Regardless of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in this case, it is this Note’s contention that the 
                                                                                                                 
the potential to stifle competition rather than facilitate it.  Particularly when trademark 
holders have economic power, giving them absolute control over the uses of their marks 
could erect significant [competitive] barriers . . . ."). 
 272. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[O]nly so 
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service . . . ."). 
 273. Supra notes 254–59 and accompanying text. 
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nominative fair use doctrine represents the legal regime of the future in the 
area of Internet-based trademark infringement cases.  Both Internet search 
technology, and the legal response to that technology are barreling along at 
remarkable speed; it is up to the Fourth Circuit to decide whether to keep 
the pace. 
  

